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The Drew Review is the annual research journal for the undergraduates of the Drew University College of Liberal Arts, publishing undergraduate research from the previous calendar year. Our mission is to showcase the intellectual vibrancy of the students of the CLA.

Currently there are five editors; editors were selected by faculty nomination, application, and invitation. Different categories of membership exist, but all members are coeditors and share equal responsibility within the journal. All eligible published students will be offered a position on the board, with the remaining positions filled by faculty nomination and student application with writing sample.

Submissions to the Review require a faculty nomination. Students who believe their work is exceptional should approach their professor for a nomination. The Drew Review accepts papers of no more than twenty-five pages in October and February from the previous semester. Papers must be submitted with a cover letter and faculty nomination. There is a limit of five nominations per professor per semester to guarantee a range of submissions.

As we are a double-blind, peer-reviewed journal, all submissions should be sent as a Word document to the corresponding editors without naming the student author or professor for whom the essay was written in the body of the essay. The student author’s name and paper title should be in the faculty nomination. Images and graphs will be published in black and white and must be compatible with Word. It is the responsibility of the author to make sure that all images can be reproduced. All published essays will use in-text citations referencing a bibliography (style of in-text reference may vary). Students can expect to be asked to make revisions prior to publication.

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Dante Alighieri’s epic poem, *La Divina Commedia* (1308), is distinguished for its abundant and clever use of allegories that trace Dante’s spiritual journey from hell to heaven, which is itself an allegory for the soul’s journey towards and union with God. Its narrative and thematic constructions are based on medieval Christian theologies and philosophies, many of which derive from or integrate ancient Greek and Roman philosophies. For example, women dancing function as symbolic representations of love and concord in the universe that are rooted in Neoplatonic and Pythagorean notions of cosmology. These reflect Dante’s well-rounded intellectual endeavors as well as his ability (like other medieval Christian figures looking to reconcile reason with religion) to successfully “weave together disparate traditions of thought and languages” (Jacoff 209). Such a theme explores Dante’s conflicted perspective on women based on their morally varied roles in the *Commedia* compared to that of the misogynistic, medieval society of Florence. It also necessarily elicits the different secular and religious and cosmological outlooks on and use of dance, including the woman’s role in it, from relevant and integral figures in medieval Florentine society. These extremely influential Florentine ideals on the subject of dance and women, and Dante’s interpretation of them are what came to establish the symbolic role of dance, or more broadly, consistently concordant movement, as a unifying art throughout the three books of the *Commedia*. In turn, this enabled the theme of women dancing as an allegory for God’s love and the perfectly harmonious and therefore divinely united universe that issued forth from that love.

Dante’s unconventional alternating portrayals in the *Commedia* of women as destructive, immoral, adulterating deceivers and temptresses, but also as astute, humble, whole-heartedly devout and, in the case of Beatrice, virtuously transcendent beings, provides a place for women in Dante’s ideal world that is level with that of men. In portraying women as
humans who are, just as men, inclined to the good and susceptible to the bad, and act morally and immorally, the *Commedia* establishes an equilibrium between genders that is reflective of the essential equilibrium of the universe. In the just will of God there is ultimate order and within that order all humans exist and possess will power and therefore have the same chances of infernal exile and celestial embrace. Dante’s belief in this is best exemplified by his inclusion of women on both ends of the moral spectrum in the *Commedia*. There are of course, in the main exemplar of lust in the *Inferno*, the ancient women Semiramis, Cleopatra, and Helen among others (*Inferno* V, 58-65). Women, such as Myrrah, who disguised herself as another to get in bed with her father, are punished for fraud in the eighth circle of hell. There are, however, even more women with great courage and intellect among the honorable pagans of Limbo (*Inferno* IV, 121-128; XXX, 37-41). The Virgin Mary reigns in Purgatory as the primary example for each virtue. Faithful and loyal earthly women are thanked for the generous prayers that aided their loved ones in ascending the mountain of Purgatory more speedily, and Matelda resides in and guides those who have arrived through the Earthly Paradise (*Purgatorio* XXIII, 85-93; XXXII, 82-4).

The most prominent example in the *Commedia* of a woman who disproves the popular medieval belief that women possess a generally sinful and tempting disposition, however, is Beatrice. Through her virtuous nature, she surpasses the limited capacities of women set by such a society and even those of humans. She is not only the gracious object of Dante’s desire, but in her “gracious state,” a sign of his ultimate desire (unbeknownst to him yet) for God, and as such, retains the sacramental powers to act as an outlet through which to access God (Vita Nuova 35). This is one of the overriding themes of the *Commedia*, the lover as intercessor to (as opposed to a distraction from) God: “whoever speaks with her shall speak with Him” (Vita Nuova 36). She is also sacramental in the sense that she has a reformative aspect. Before acting as a guide through Paradise, Beatrice harshly condemns Dante in the Earthly Paradise, invoking the deepest contrition within him to repent his sins and by doing so “acts as priest who confesses Dante” and contributes to the continuing transformation of his self (*Purgatorio* XXX, 103-145; Lansing 889). As women who possess such admirable and esteemed roles in the *Commedia*, Beatrice, Mary and many others are
demonstrations of the virtuous efficacy and eminence of women in Christianity. This justifies and allows women, specifically the seven dancing women in the Earthly Paradise, to serve as personifications for something as commendable as the seven rotating celestial spheres of Paradise. These spheres in turn represent the virtues, the place of each soul in the Empyrean, and are constituents of the concordance of the universe.

Dance served multiple purposes within both secular and religious realms that were themselves extensively integrated in medieval Florentine society. The idea of dance as having a unifying function in several areas of Florentine culture is expressed in its versatile history within the city. It was, for the majority of its spectators, most commonly a form of entertainment during major festivals in the city; but in performing these rhythmically structured yet dynamically stimulating spectacles, these dancers would bring crowds of people together who would watch “l’arte giocunda” intently and together they would indulge in the “dolce effetto del dazare” as a form of exultant celebration (Guglielmo Ebreo, De Pratica Seu Arte Tripudii, as cited by Berghaus 56). Dance was also customary during formal occasions, such as an aristocratic wedding, which itself is a sacrament that represents love through the establishment of a lifelong commitment and unity between two people. Fifteenth century cassoni, “large [decorated] chests that were given to the brides by their parents and in which their dowries were placed,” tended to depict scenes of a wedding dance like the chiarenzana (Gombosi 291). Dance performances, specifically by women “in honor of high-ranking, non-Florentine visitors” were used significantly as a political tactic in negotiating relationships with powerful and influential figures (Bryce 1077). From a superficial perspective, these dances were just common forms of entertainment with which to keep the city’s guests humored. More intricately, however, in a predominantly male-controlled environment like that of medieval Florence, where women were considered one of the many fruits of male establishment, dance served as a way for a society to publically display their women and show how well they had been preserved. Women demonstrate the height of one’s prestige. They represent the best of what Florentine patrician society has to offer. They serve as exchanges of honor, capital, but especially alliances. At the insistence of her fiancé’s family, the Pazzi, Bianca de’ Medici danced for and with cardinals in an attempt to solidify “financial
relations between cardinals as prestigious clients and the Pazzi as international merchants and bankers” (Bryce 1082). In being likened to the city’s “resources,” women were used as such and could “be pressed into the service of the state and promotion and enhancement of civic identity” (Bryce 1083-4). The role of dance remains integral in this process, and not just because it appropriates the public display of women. Those things considered honorable and valuable in women of the medieval aristocracy, such as refinement, beauty, talent, virtuosity, and a relentless self-composure, are demonstrated through dance and therefore make it an honorable art.

The medieval dance masters and theorists adopted a conception of dance that is also employed by Dante throughout the Commedia, and reiterates Neoplatonic and Pythagorean notions that the universe possesses an inherent order through an elaborately number-oriented, “supervened fitting-together” (Berghaus 44). This harmony is most commonly expressed in the motions of the celestial spheres and sustains the universe within a “unified system” (Berghaus 45). Pythagoras believed that “it is through number that unity as primordial principle of Being extends into the material world and becomes multeity” (45). Accordingly, numbers provide a comprehensible means of explaining the fundamentals of creation in the physical world and its perfect unity. The numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 are a tetrad and in sum they become the number 10, or a “decad”. In Christianity, a “decad” symbolizes divine order or God, in which everything lies and is perfectly and systematically amalgamated, like the tetrad in the decad (45). In that sense the tetrad represents the multiplicity of the universe that is perfectly contained within the divine constructs of God or decad. This theory is also consistent with the medieval construction of ten heavens, the tenth being Empyrean, the ultimate and absolute heaven in Dante’s Paradiso in which all beings of light (souls and angels) co-exist joyously. Put differently, the tetrad and decad are “models of perfection,” creating “unity out of [systematized] multeity, and [systematized] multeity out of unity.” According to Beatrice “this order” in its perfection is what “makes the universe like God” (Berghaus 45; Paradiso I, 104-5).

In addition, Pythagoras taught that these same numerical principles could also be applied, along with “concordant musical sounds,” to the “rhythmic structure” of dance, and in doing so, properly articulated through the body “the concord of the heavenly
spheres” (Berghaus 45). For that reason, in his medieval dance treatise, *Dialogo del Ballo* (1555), Rinaldo Corso argues that because, in its noblest form, dance is a demonstration of God’s perfection reflected in the divine harmony of the universe and is therefore the result of “furore,” it is a “virtuous, even sacred art form” (Berghaus 61; Corso, *Dialogo del Ballo*, as cited by Berghaus 62). Taking this a little further, Christianity deems creation as an act of God so that He might see “his splendor” that “Eternal Love,” from which all things came into being, reflected back onto Him through “new loves,” in which all things continue to persist (*Paradiso* XXIX, 14, 18). It is through love that everything becomes naturally inclined to desire God and in doing so moves the universe in its attempt to get closer to Him, and therefore, perfection. To do so, it must work perfectly. Hence, the essential existence of dance, or the consistently rational and concordant movement that “came into being contemporaneously with the primal origin of the universe… together with love,” through which love divinely works to unify the universe with God (Berghaus 48). In this way, dance is itself divine and the most complete and unifying of all art forms. This is exemplified throughout the *Commedia* through movement itself. As Dante travels from hell to heaven, closer to God and with each step his love for Him better realized, movement within these realms becomes increasingly ordered and uniform until it can actually be distinguished as dance in Purgatory and even further a “celestial ballet” in heaven.

In the *Inferno*, where lost souls who submitted themselves to the confines of sin suffer in perpetual damnation, there reigns chaos and disorder in every facet, including the souls’ movements. These souls were significantly “diverted by false pleasures” that misled them, confined them to sin and “turned [them] toward earth,” in the wrong direction away from God (*Paradiso* I, 134-5). It made slaves of them on earth as it does more obviously now in hell, subjecting them to irrational and pointless punishment, as they had acted irrationally and pointless on earth. Such is the case for the avaricious and the prodigal in the Fourth Circle as they “dance their round dance,” “wheeling weights, they used their chests to push” in opposing directions and so each would only get halfway before “shattering the other when they meet” like a dysfunctional and “bizarre pas de deux” (*Inferno* VII, 23-4, 27). These ineffective and absurd acts are a metaphor for their behaviors on earth in full pursuit of something as trivial and unfulfilling as material gain. Because this
is unfulfilling, the souls blindly sought more to fill in the void, practicing immoderation. In this way they had no measures. Without measure, how could one keep track of and “follow the one true path?” (Paradiso XXIX, 86). They did not, and they fell into disarray. Similarly, the souls who indulged in lustful acts and whose desires were disoriented, like the tragic lovers Paolo and Francesca, were themselves in hell disoriented by “the hellish hurricane, which never rests, drives on the spirits with its violence… now here, now there, now down, now up, it drives them” (Inferno V, 31-2, 43). It seemed almost like a sloppy, never-ending waltz that depended less on the dancers’ abilities to keep up than it did the wind and storm to keep them going. It was completely chaotic and disordered and in that sense hardly recognized as dance. By exclusively tending to their own selfish and therefore limited desires which only brought immediate and temporary fulfillment, with disregard to the harm it would cause others and ultimately themselves in the long run, they acted out of order with God’s will, much less in love of Him. Hence, the blinded souls who “when they come up against the ruined slope… they curse the force of the divine,” reaffirm in their misplaced hatred and therefore misplaced desire, their inability to reason as to why they are justly there (Inferno V, 34, 36). In the irrationality of their acts and of their movements they reveal how fragmented and detached from God they are.

In Purgatorio on the other hand things are literally looking up. The souls look up intently, “keeping their eyes on the heavenly wheels” as they move in the same orderly direction towards them (Purgatorio VIII, 18). Many of these souls by one last act of contrition demonstrate goodness, meaning that they still loved God and hence they were saved. Now in Purgatory they purge themselves of sin once and for all and prepare to enter the heavenly dominion. They do so by redirecting their desire to God, nurturing the intellect through reasoning of their sins that allow them to understand God, and reestablishing the will so that it becomes one with God’s will. These are the three components of one’s self that must be properly governed, wholly intact, and directed to the same end so that one may move more swiftly and accordingly to God in Paradise: he is made whole the closer he gets to Him. This constitutes yet another set of forces that must be in harmony to partake in God and it is here in Purgatory that they are harmonized. This supports the argument of the 15th century dance master, Domenico da Piacenza, in defense of the noble art
of dance. He believed dance, properly done, was “an exercise to increase moral and intellectual virtue” because it implemented “misura, memoria, agilitate e maniera” and in doing so took as much “inteletto e fatica” as one could find (Domenico da Piacenza, De Arte Saltanda et Choreas Ducend, as cited by Smith 18). It could be argued that the gluttonous demonstrated some of the same characteristics when, as if led by a drill sergeant, with misura (measure) and fatica (effort), the shades—who were “so emaciated that their taut skin took shape from bones beneath”—ran in a “file” round the mountain reciting, with such memoria (memory) and inteletto (intellect), examples of temperance as a means of redemption (Purgatorio XXII, 142-54; XXIII, 23-4, 66). One can see the calculated and ordered movements associated with dance begin to take shape in this example. It also implies that those things that call for the extensive application of one’s intellect and effort in fulfilling them must be righteous, and that would make sense because that which requires full exertion of one’s intellect and effort (fulfilling God’s will) is the essence of righteousness. Because dance “exercises” the intellect and requires that both “body and mind are in harmony with each other,” it significantly aids in establishing a more virtuous, whole and therefore unifying self, the goal of those in Purgatory (Berghaus 59). Additionally, the most well-regarded dance master in medieval Italy, Guglielmo Ebreo, believed that from dance, which presents in its movements a “rational order of things... beauty, goodness, and virtue are derived” (Berghaus 59). It is no coincidence that at the top of Mount Purgatory in the Earthly Paradise, where on the verge of celestial embrace the earth comes closest to God, dance can finally be distinguished as the seven virtuously harmonious spheres personified by “three circling women” and “four other women [who], dressed in crimson, danced” (Purgatorio XXIX, 121, 130-1).

Finally, Paradiso is where dance in its most precise definition takes form and has its most eminent position in displaying and sustaining the perfection of the universe. It is here that Dante’s doubts are put to rest and each perplexity disregarded if not solved as he comes to know more and more about the nature of God's ways and the deft motions of dance become more and more recognizable. These souls go as far as forming words and the image of an eagle “in their lights” and “in their flights” as they teach Dante the value of the virtue of justice in the sphere of Jupiter (Paradiso XVIII, 76-7). Here, dance can be
seen everywhere and only grows in aspiration the farther up toward Empyrean one goes. From the souls in the sphere of Mercury who “moved within their dance, as if they were swiftest sparks” to the two rings consisting of the souls from the two saintly orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, revolving jubilantly and concordantly around Dante and Beatrice, “motion matched with motion, song with song” (Paradiso VII, 7-8; XII, 6). It is in the measure of their love that these beings of light are variously ordered and differ in “radiance, more brightly or subdued” as well as speed (Paradiso XXIX, 141). Although initially this may seem to be implying disproportion to the essentially balanced universe of God, it actually lends to that balance. According to Francesco Giorgio’s De harmonia mundi, “the consonance of cosmic bodies occurs when equal and unequal things are brought into cohesion.” Unequal things, even tendencies, must exist in order to establish concord in the first place (Berghaus 51). The souls are content in their place and in the proportion of love that God has allotted them because they do not long to love God most, but to be perfectly united with Him. To do so, one’s desires must align with that of God. Piccarda, the first soul Dante encounters in Paradise, explains that “all this kingdom wills that which will please the King whose will is rule.” Thus their “will becomes one single will,” that of God’s, and “in His will there is our peace” (Paradiso III, 81, 83-5). Furthermore, in a perfectly concordant universe there is no need for discord because all things agree with each other in their longings, as represented by and in their movements or dances. Although different in their virtues and love for the Lord, they all want the same thing, God, and in their common need are brought together to love each other in love of God and in this way they are perfectly unified.

Finally, in the engagement of dance one works through different, yet essentially agreeable and corresponding movements that sustain each other towards a common end. In medieval Christianity, the seven celestial spheres of the universe and the souls that inhabit them are urged by their love for God to become increasingly concordant and unified to each other, and ultimately to God, in their love. As a result, this growing unity and concordance is physically expressed in their motions, as they move closer to God and the eternal Paradise. This increasing order and unity in movement can also be recognized in the souls as Dante moves from the Inferno to Paradiso, until it can actually be distinguished as dance at the end of Purgatorio and throughout
Paradisio. In this way, the seven perpetually moving celestial spheres are representations of love and the harmonious universe and, because the seven ladies from the Earthly Paradise serve as representations of these spheres and personify their movements through dance, they too are symbolic representations of love and the harmony of the universe under God.

Works Cited


After the events of September 11, 2001, the United Nations (UN), and specifically the Security Council (Council), became engaged in efforts to place counter-terrorism in a more prominent position than it had been. This is especially seen in Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, passed just one day (2001a) and little over two weeks after the attacks (2001b), respectively. In addition to calling upon states to combat terrorism in a number of ways, resolution 1373 even went so far as to call for the creation of a committee under the Security Council “to monitor implementation of this resolution” (UN Security Council 2001b), which would become the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC or Committee). However, one important aspect was missing from these hasty attempts at including counter-terrorism in the UN dialogue. The words “human rights” were never included in the initial resolution condemning the attacks on September 11th and ordering states to adopt measures combating terrorism (UN Security Council 2001a). The term was mentioned just once in resolution 1373, only in regard to granting refugee status (CTC “Human Rights” 2011).

This initial exclusion of human rights from the counter-terrorism dialogue reflects how the matter would be treated for the next few years. In 2002, the first chair of the CTC even stated that “monitoring performance against other international conventions, including human rights law, is outside of the scope of the... mandate” (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). Only after human rights abuses had been committed in the name of counter-terrorism during these years did the Security Council and CTC turn attention to human rights in counter-terrorism. In fact, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED or Executive Directorate), established by resolution 1535 (CTC “Human Rights” 2011), would become a body meant to work closely with states through country visits and confidential reports (Restrepo 2011), including on human rights (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). Efforts have been
made to include human rights in the counter-terrorism dialogue, but how effective have they been?

Rosemary Foot explored this question, arguing that “the power of the human rights norm has... been demonstrated within the setting of the UN” (2007, 513), with “moves” and “arguments” allowing for a “deepening of procedures that are attentive to human rights” (2007, 511). This may be true within the UN as a whole, but is this norm so powerful in countering terrorism? What kind of effect does this norm have on the wider international community in this regard? Focusing on UN efforts in the Security Council, CTC, and CTED, this paper will argue that despite some progressive measures to include human rights in counter-terrorism, these are overshadowed by the overt weaknesses in terms of the initial exclusion of human rights, inadequate reforms, and the subsequent effects on the international community as a whole that must be addressed in order to give human rights a more substantial position in the counter-terrorism dialogue.

First, the paper will provide a brief history of UN counter-terrorism efforts, along with human rights abuses that took place in the name of counter-terrorism, including the examples of China, Russia, and the United States (US), and attempts at inclusion of human rights in counter-terrorism at the UN. Then, the importance of including human rights at the time of these attempts will be highlighted, along with hopes conveyed for these measures. Despite these most recent reforms, limitations and weaknesses of the UN, especially CTC and CTED, and the effect on the international community as a whole, will be considered. Finally, the conclusion will discuss reforms, especially in relation to CTED, that may be possible to create a more effective human rights aspect of counter-terrorism, all within the boundaries of what other UN bodies are able to do already, which may be helpful given the upcoming 2012 interim review of CTED called for by resolution 1963 (UN Security Council 2010).

History of Counter-Terrorism and Inclusion of Human Rights at the UN

Before the events of September 11, 2001, the UN had little part in counter-terrorism efforts as a whole, with inability on the General Assembly’s part to create a convention against terrorism and an overall lack of attention by the Security Council to this issue (Messmer and Yordan 2010, 173). The action by the
Council prior to the events of September 11th concerning terrorism were limited due to the thought that these issues were better addressed nationally (Messmer and Yordan 2010, 173). These measures included sanctions against countries believed to be connected to terrorism, resolution 1269 of 1999 requesting states to work together against terrorist acts, and the creation of what is called the “1267 Committee,” which monitored sanctions against the Taliban and Al Qaeda (UN “Security Council Actions” 2011).

However, the events of September 11, 2001 became the catalyst for change in UN, and especially Security Council, attention to counter-terrorism efforts. Just one day after the attacks, the Council passed resolution 1368 condemning the actions and calling on states to “work together” and “redouble their efforts” against terrorist acts (2001a). This resolution was followed by resolution 1373 two weeks later which provided more specific, binding demands under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on states in combating terrorism (2001b). These included criminalization of terrorist financing, the freezing of funds related to terrorist acts, denial of all financial support for terrorist groups, suppression of support for terrorism, the sharing of information and cooperation with other governments, and criminalization of assistance for terrorism, as well as the creation of CTC (CTC “About Us” 2011). This Committee includes all members of the Security Council and was given the tasks to monitor implementation of the measures by states in the same resolution and receive country reports on implementation (UN Security Council 2001b).

As mentioned above, there was a significant lack of discussion on where the topic of human rights lies in counter-terrorism. In both of the important Security Council resolutions passed after September 11th, there was only one explicit mention of human rights in resolution 1373, which is “to take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts” (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). Also noted above, the attitude toward human rights in counter-terrorism at this time was exemplified by a statement made by the first CTC Chair, Sir Jeremy Greenstock of the United Kingdom (CTC “Former Chairpersons” 2011), that said the “Committee is mandated to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373…”
Monitoring performance against other international conventions, including human rights law, is outside the scope of the...Committee’s mandate” (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). The lack of human rights considerations in the earliest counter-terrorism resolutions and initial attitudes toward including the topic would reflect the connection between human rights and counter-terrorism for years to come.

The devastating effect that terrorism itself has on human rights, including impacts on individuals, especially in regard to “the rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity,” as well as on society as a whole (OHCHR 2008a, 7), should not be minimized. Under international law, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) would come to explain that states have an obligation “to protect the life and security of individuals under their jurisdiction,” allowing those states “to take effective counter-terrorism measures, to prevent and deter future terrorist attacks and to prosecute those that are responsible for carrying out such acts” (2008a, 8-9), actions demanded of states under resolution 1373 as well (UN Security Council 2001b). With this ability to protect individuals from terrorism, however, OHCHR also explains that states also have the duty to ensure that all counter-terrorism measures “comply with... international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law” (OHCHR 2008a, 9) given the abuses connected to counter-terrorism measures implemented by states (1).

Years before this was explained by OHCHR, Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that, “since September 11, many governments have found that a convenient way to fend off international scrutiny of abusive practices is to wave the anti-terrorism banner, whether in a genuine effort to defeat terrorism or as a pretext to quash dissent or separatist sentiment” (2004, 1). So, the obligation that would be found in the future that states have in creating counter-terrorism measures compliant with international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law had obviously not been carried out in the past, as seen in the cases of the US, United Kingdom, Russia, China, Israel, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe (Roth 2004, 1). In general, measures taken by some states to combat terrorism have threatened human rights themselves, including the use of torture and ill-treatment, engagement in refoulement of terrorist suspects, the decline in independence of judiciaries,
repression on opposition voices, and the allocation of resources from social programs to state security (OHCHR 2008a, 1).

In a 2003 Briefing Paper for the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), HRW highlighted ten country cases of human rights abuses in the name of counter-terrorism. Given the positions that China, Russia, and the US have as permanent members in the Security Council, and therefore the role they played in Council measures on counter-terrorism, it would be interesting to briefly explore these particular cases of counter-terrorism measures abuse.

China was one of the first states to report to the CTC in accordance with resolution 1373, providing a 2001 report on measures that had been taken by the government against the financing of terrorism, support of terrorism, and for enhanced communication and international cooperation against terrorism (UN Security Council 2001c). However, HRW found that the government had been using counter-terrorism measures in dealing with the Uyghur community, an ethnic group located in the Xinjiang Region, when both peaceful and violent actions that were previously labeled as “separatist” turned to “allegations... of complicity in international terrorism” after the events of September 11, 2001 (2003, 10). A report released in 2002 claimed Uyghur involvement in terrorist activities including “explosions, assassinations, attacks on police and government institutions, and poison and arson attacks” (HRW 2003, 10), even though before the September 11th events and subsequent calls on the international community of states to create counter-terrorism measures, this was never considered (HRW 2003, 10). In other words, it was finally a way that the Chinese government could take care of the already problematic separatist movement under an acceptable guise.

Russia was another country in which counter-terrorism measures were used in ways to address underlying national security interests after September 11, 2001. The State was also one of the first to submit a report on its implementation of resolution 1373 (UN Security Council 2001d), but HRW also found problems in Russian use of counter-terrorism measures in Chechnya (HRW 2003, 18-19). After the events of September 11th and demands for international measures against terrorism, the Russian government made attempts to justify its operations in Chechnya as “its contribution to the international campaign...
against terrorism” (HRW 2003, 18). An interview with an employee in the Europe and Central Asia division at HRW revealed a number of practices by Russian troops in Chechnya during this time. According to this employee, between 2001 and 2003, two main methods were used to deal with alleged insurgents and finding information. These included zachistka, a sweep operation involving house-by-house raids, and adresnaya zachistka, a targeted operation to find an individual or house based on suspicions, both of which would result in serious human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance, lack of counsel, and abuse in obtaining confessions (2011). So, the Russian government also attempted to justify its actions under counter-terrorism.

Another important example of misusing counter-terrorism measures comes with the initial victim of the actions that led to greater UN involvement in counter-terrorism, the US. Again, the government was very prompt in reporting on implementation of resolution 1373 (UN Security Council 2001e). Such swift action is understandable given the direct impact that the US suffered on September 11, 2001, as well as the amount of pressure the state itself put on the UN concerning counter-terrorism after these events, pointed out by the Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism division employee of HRW during an interview (2011). However, HRW found that US measures also violated human rights, including “arbitrary and secret detention of non-citizens, secret deportation hearings for persons suspected of connections to terrorism, the authorization of military commissions to try non-citizen terrorists, a failure to abide by the Geneva Conventions in the treatment of detainees held in US military custody in Cuba and elsewhere, and the military detention without charge or access to counsel of US citizens designated as ‘enemy combatants’” (2003, 22). In particular, this would be revealed as the time period when horrific abuses in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib took place, encouraged by a nationwide policy of ignoring obligations under international law (HRW 2004). So, the victim State of the September 11th attacks that helped launch a policy change in the UN would turn out to be one of the principle abusers of counter-terrorism measures.

Despite these alarming examples of misuse of counter-terrorism measures, the CTC began “a more pro-active policy on human rights” in 2004 with the creation of CTED by Security
Council resolution 1535 (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). The extent of CTED’s role in this policy change can be seen in a background paper by CTED on CTC measures for human rights, notably filled with a majority of CTED actions (2010). This resolution not only reminded states of their obligations to create measures that are “in accordance with... international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law” (UN Security Council 2004a, 1), but also created CTED in order to assist the Committee, assigning a number of tasks to the new Executive Directorate in the Committee report (UN Security Council 2004a, 2). The Executive Directorate, in addition to a number of tasks supporting the Committee, was mandated to “liaise with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and other human rights organizations in matters related to counter-terrorism” (UN Security Council 2004b, 8). Indeed, this resolution, along with the report on the Committee, would be the beginning of more, albeit minimal, attempts to include human rights in the counter-terrorism dialogue at the UN.

Security Council resolutions on terrorism passed after 1535 continued to provide either mere reminders to states about their obligations under human rights law at most, with the example of resolution 1566 (UN Security Council 2004c, 1), or no mention of human rights at the very least, seen in 1611, 1617, and 1618 (UN Security Council 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Finally, in 2005, despite a previous attempt to do so (UN Security Council 2003), and at the same time as Kofi Annan’s finding that recent counter-terrorism measures violate human rights (Foot 2007, 490), resolution 1624 included, not just a reminder in the preamble, but also “stress[ed]” in the 4th operative paragraph that states take human rights into consideration when implementing the counter-terrorism measures included in the resolution, as well as including a call for states to report on 1624 implementation (UN Security Council 2005d).

Also in 2005, the CTED created the position of senior human rights officer position (Mariner 2007), who was mandated, according to email correspondence with an employee at CTED, to report directly to the Assistant Secretary-General and the CTED Executive Director, while supporting CTED and Member States of the UN in the human rights dimension of counter-terrorism, especially in compliance with international obligations of Member States with human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law (2011).
“Policy guidance” was also adopted for CTED, which involved advising the Committee on including obligations under international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law in state dialogue, on making sure implementation of resolution 1624 complies with these obligations, and liaising with the OHCHR and other human rights organizations (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). Put together, these measures, among others, provided evidence of what was thought to be the “tide… turning,” as said by the employee in the Terrorism/Counter-terrorism division at HRW (2011).

**Importance of Including Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism**

Why was it so important for the UN, especially the Security Council, to begin consideration of human rights in counter-terrorism? There really was a duty to do so, any way one looks at it. After the passing of resolution 1373, in the haste to create these counter-terrorism measures, “civil liberties and fundamental human rights” were subject to “negative consequences” (OHCHR 2008a, 20). According to Rosemary Foot, there was also a lack of clarity in the founding resolution when it came to the inclusion of human rights in counter-terrorism efforts (2007, 496). In a much more pessimistic view on why human rights were not given consideration in counter-terrorism measures, Kenneth Roth believed that states covered up abusive practices with the guise of counter-terrorism, in cases of both truly countering terrorism and suppressing previously troublesome separatist movements (2004, 1). Whether it was simply due to a lack of awareness or more deliberate motives, human rights were indeed given a backseat position. There needed to be a cleaning of the mess that had been made with human rights in counter-terrorism, especially since the UN, upholding values of human rights, and the Security Council, with its precedence over international peace and security (Flynn 2007, 371), played important roles.

After this turning of the tide in 2005, there were hopes for the positive role that human rights would play in counter-terrorism measures. Rosemary Foot admitted that “severe damage has been inflicted” but “recovery is a realistic expectation given the apparent embeddedness of the human rights idea in certain domestic, regional, and international institutions” (2007, 514). Also, while obviously in a biased position, E.J. Flynn, current Senior Human Rights Adviser, argued “increased prominence, if not full-on consideration, of human rights in the Security Council’s
work on counter-terrorism by the end of 2006” (2007, 371). Joanne Mariner, who worked for HRW on terrorism and counter-terrorism issues, even expressed hopes for the future, with “human rights progress... made in recent years” especially with “the CTC... taking steps to integrate human rights into its work” and “barriers... erod[ing]” between human rights and counter-terrorism (2007).

Indeed, there has been some progress in recent years with including human rights in counter-terrorism work at the UN, especially in regard to the Security Council and CTED. The Council passed resolution 1805 reiterating CTED’s role in advising the Committee on issues of human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law (2008). Even further, the Council passed the remarkable resolution 1963 reminding states of the connection between counter-terrorism measures and human rights, calling on CTED to “develop activities” related to this, as well as make sure human rights are considered in the implementation of resolutions 1373 and 1624 (2010). Email correspondence with the CTED employee mentioned above revealed a number of successful practices and considerations that point to the progress envisaged by Foot, Flynn, and Mariner. This employee, as an insider at CTED, has seen that the work of the Senior Human Rights Adviser is taken seriously both within the Directorate and at the national level (2011). Also, CTED is a member of the human rights working group of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) of the Secretary-General (CTC “Human Rights” 2011), which the CTED employee said consists of 31 bodies covering human rights issues throughout the UN and international community as a whole, making sure to keep each other updated and to avoid doubling of efforts (2011). In addition to this broader working group, this employee revealed one within CTED, bringing officials of different counter-terrorism themes, including legal, border control, financing of terrorism, and communications, to discuss human rights issues once a week (2011). The establishment of this group was recommended by the Executive Director and resolution 1805 in order to “enhance expertise and develop common approaches” (CTC “Human Rights” 2011). Some considerations for the future, as conveyed by this employee, include the increased attention being paid to prevention in counter-terrorism, which involves human rights violations, and the upcoming global survey on resolution 1624 implementation (2011). This resolution included a call for counter-
terrorism measures to be implemented with obligations to international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law in mind (UN Security Council 2005d).

These most recent and continued efforts at including human rights in the overall counter-terrorism discussion are commendable and provide a huge step from the initial position of the topic. However, there are significant, debilitating limitations and weaknesses in UN efforts and subsequent effects on the international community of states that must be addressed in order to give human rights the position in counter-terrorism that was hoped for by many.

**Limitations and Weaknesses in UN Efforts and Effects on States**

These additional practices attempting to include human rights in the counter-terrorism discussion are no solution for the deep structural problems affecting UN efforts and the lack of noticeable results in the international community. The stretch that the Senior Human Rights Adviser of CTED feels, minimal UN reforms, differences between law and policy of a state, and the creation of new abusive laws and practices all point to weaknesses and continuing inability on the part of the UN to connect human rights to counter-terrorism measures.

First, as brought up by the Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism employee at HRW, there is an inherent weakness on the part of UN efforts when it comes to the fact that there is only one human rights officer in CTED (2011). As mentioned above, CTED was meant to be a body working closely with states by carrying out country visits and considering confidential reports prepared by those States (Restrepo 2011). The human rights officer’s role, as the CTED employee relayed via email, involves this close contact as well, participating in country visits and contributing to these reports and country assessments (2011). However, how can a mandate including reporting to the Assistant Secretary-General and the Executive Director of CTED, assisting both CTED and Member States in considering human rights in counter-terrorism, and participating in country visits and assessments with the goal of compliance with international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law, as mentioned above, be fulfilled by just one official? While the officer may have three or four support staff members (Yordan 2011), the simple answer to the question is, it
cannot. The ability of the human rights officer to fulfill the tasks of the position is spread thin, seen especially in that the human rights officer is not always able to participate in country visits. The Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism employee at HRW revealed that the human rights officer is not on every country visit that CTED participates in, with “promises” that human rights will be brought up by other officials on these visits (2011). For a body that values close contact and cooperation, it is not a good sign to countries hosting CTED that the human rights officer cannot always be present, possibly translating to a lack of importance in considering human rights in counter-terrorism.

In addition to the overextension of the work of the human rights officer, any recent reforms and new practices connecting human rights and counter-terrorism in the UN have been good, but extremely “modest,” as stated by the Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism employee at HRW (2011). While recent Security Council resolutions 1805 and 1963 (2008, 2010) have been very progressive concerning human rights and counter-terrorism, especially in the consideration of the role of CTED, actual practices and reforms have been mainly supplementary, rather than attempts at reforming and improving current practices in order to become more effective. In addition to the working groups that continue to be used to discuss human rights in counter-terrorism, mentioned by the CTED employee (2011), the HRW Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism employee mentioned a pamphlet published by CTITF on human rights in counter-terrorism as well (2011). However, these practices cannot be considered major reforms making existing structures more effective. Rather, they are minimal additions that barely make a dent when considering more influential practices like the appointment of the Permanent Representative of India to Chair of the CTC (CTC “Our Mandate” 2011). This is problematic for human rights, according to the Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism HRW employee, due to the country’s “disappointing” lack of attention to human rights in counter-terrorism measures (2011), including torture and arbitrary detention of persons suspected of terrorism, covered in the recent HRW report on India (2011).

State actions, or inaction, merely provide evidence of the ineffectiveness coming from limitations and weaknesses of the attempts to connect human rights to counter-terrorism measures. Even the CTED employee conveyed via email that implementation
has been a challenge in terms of human rights (2011). In fact, the majority of regions assessed in the 2010 survey on implementation of resolution 1373 have had issues with human rights in counter-terrorism measures enacted (CTC). Human rights violations continue to be a part of counter-terrorism measures in a number of ways: differences between law and policy, renewed measures, and new instances even after UN efforts for human rights in 2004 and 2005.

First, the HRW Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism division employee brought up an interesting phenomenon of a divide in law and unwritten policy when it comes to counter-terrorism measures (2011). For example, the US established the PATRIOT Act following the attacks of September 11th and adoption of Security Council resolution 1373, worrisome because of its threat to freedoms according to the HRW employee (2011). On the other hand, unwritten counter-terrorism policy of the US, including black sites, torture, and practices in Guantanamo Bay, are also human rights violations that are worrisome in addition to the law on paper, as the HRW employee pointed out (2011).

This idea of a divide between law and policy can also be applied to the situation of counter-terrorism measures with Russia and Chechnya. As a HRW employee in the Europe and Central Asia division explained, in the beginning of Russia’s operations in Chechnya, there was little Chechen involvement in both sweep and targeted operations (2011). However, from 2002 to 2003, this employee detailed that there was a so-called “Chechenization” of operations, with more of a role being played by Chechen security forces (2011). Despite a supposed end to operations in Chechnya in 2009 (BBC News 2009), up until today, local forces have taken over previously Russian operations, described by this HRW employee as a deliberate Russian attempt to “indigenize” and “legitimize” these procedures (2011). Both Russian and Chechen forces were relentless, with 3,000 to 5,000 reported to have disappeared between 1999 and 2005. The operations were declared a crime against humanity by HRW (2005). Under Ramzan Kadyrov, president of Chechnya and Kremlin sympathizer, there has now been a policy of “collective punishment” in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures, targeting entire families of suspects, according to the Europe and Central Asia division employee (2011). This divide between law and unwritten policy can and probably has seriously
affected the work of the UN, especially CTED, in connecting human rights and counter-terrorism and evaluating state measures, with the cases of the US and Russia providing evidence of ineffectiveness. Why would a state report on its own unwritten policy when human rights violations are involved?

Another way in which human rights violations continue to present themselves in counter-terrorism measures can be seen in the case of China and the Uyghur community, through renewed attempts at countering terrorism. As stated above, HRW expressed findings in a 2003 Briefing Paper to the UNCHR that China had been using counter-terrorism measures against the Uyghur community, a group previously labeled separatist (10) and known to be religiously repressed (OnIslam 2011). The events of September 11th seemed to give reason to further crack down on the Uyghurs, now labeled terrorists, and accuse the community of affiliation with Al Qaeda (OnIslam 2011). The Chinese government has been accused of “massive security crackdowns” in the Xinjiang region, where the Uyghur community resides, and “religious repression” (OnIslam 2011), and renewed counter-terrorism efforts can have the same, if not worse effects on this community. According to Radio Free Asia, China has recently passed a strengthened counter-terrorism law that many are concerned will affect, once again, the Uyghur community in the Xinjiang region (2011). The government has declared this region as one of the most threatening in terms of terrorism, but Sophie Richardson of HRW stated that counter-terrorism measures have been used more to “persecute dissent” rather than “promote national security” (Radio Free Asia 2011). Strengthened measures that previously have led to discrimination are worrisome in terms of human rights and show the little effect UN and CTED efforts have had in the State realm when it comes to connecting human rights considerations to counter-terrorism measures.

Another example of ineffectiveness can be seen in the recent, and very blatant, misuse of counter-terrorism measures against protestors in Bahrain. In a report to the Human Rights Council (HRC), HRW pointed out a counter-terrorism bill called “Protecting Society from Terrorist Acts” that was passed in Bahrain in 2006, which seriously concerned the HRC Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights because of the broad definitions of terrorism and terrorist acts, as well as the ability to detain suspects for extended amounts of time without
charge or review (2008). The HAQ Movement of Liberties and Democracy of Bahrain made remarks on this bill before it was passed, saying that the bill is an attack on the right to express one’s views, calling for the death penalty or life imprisonment for conduct such as criticizing the government (2006, 1). The bill was also found to consider the creation of an organization a terrorist act if it “disrupts the provisions of the Constitution, laws, bylaws or harms the national unity,” punished by life imprisonment or death for joining or creating such an organization (2006, 1-2). Lastly, the group discovered that the Public Prosecution has taken control of judges and the Courts (2006, 2).

Protests broke out in early 2011 by the Shiite majority, who for years have felt discriminated against, given the Sunni monarchy, leading to “bloody military crackdowns” (Slackman 2011). In March, the government declared a state of emergency, leading to 800 being arrested for taking part (Green 2011), with worries of other Arab Spring uprisings influencing protestors in Bahrain according to the HRW Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism employee (2011). Recently, a trial of 21 protestors took place, all charged with “plotting to overthrow the monarchy” connected to foreign terrorist organizations (Green 2011). This is believed to be an attempt to blame Iran, a long-time regional rival (Green 2011), even though the main reasons for the “secular and democratic” protest calling for constitutional monarchy (Slackman 2011) included “deep social inequality and dictatorial rule” (Green 2011). Bahrain has become another example of a state using the guise of counter-terrorism to deal with an already troublesome situation in the country. This bill was passed and these crackdowns on protestors under counter-terrorism happened after the change in UN attitude toward human rights in counter-terrorism, so obviously UN efforts in doing this have been ineffective if blatant abuse of counter-terrorism measures continues beyond the supposed “turning of the tide” in 2004 and 2005.

**Conclusion**

Despite the attempts and good practices that the UN, especially the Security Council and subsidiary counter-terrorism bodies, have engaged in to include human rights in the counter-terrorism dialogue, there is a persistent disconnect between the two topics. There was importance attached to including human rights in counter-terrorism measures in 2004 and 2005, but effects on state behavior have been largely non-existent, as seen in the
cases of the US, Russia, China, and Bahrain. Constraints on the ability of the CTED Senior Human Rights Adviser to fulfill his mandate and the lack of substantial reforms add to the evidence of weakness in UN and CTED efforts. Considering these limitations and inefficiencies, the UN must come up with more effective ways to include human rights in counter-terrorism, both in UN and CTED efforts and in influencing subsequent State behavior.

First, the UN and its counter-terrorism bodies should continue the good practices being carried out already. While they are not within the boundaries of the Security Council counter-terrorism bodies themselves, considerations of human rights in counter-terrorism from other branches of the UN are helpful and information provided by them (CTC “Human Rights” 2011), should continue, as seen in the OHCHR fact sheet noted above (2008a). Inside the counter-terrorism bodies themselves, however, good practices include the human rights working groups, both within the broader CTITF and within CTED itself, brought up by the CTED employee via email (2011). Moreover, dissemination of information is helpful, like the pamphlet recently created by CTITF that was mentioned by the Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism HRW employee (2011). Also notable is the increased focus on the prevention of situations conducive to terrorism in both the General Assembly and Security Council, as mentioned by the CTED employee (2011). These practices have been explored in a report by the CTITF Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism (2009) and an International Peace Institute report by Fink and El-Said (2011). While these are commendable practices on the part of the UN, they should not replace true reform itself.

In addition to keeping these good practices, there is one major reform within the boundaries of the existing structure of CTED that must take place. According to the CTED employee, the Senior Human Rights Adviser of CTED, seen as the figurehead of close contact with countries concerning human rights in counter-terrorism (2011) is, in fact, unable to participate on every country visit, with the promise that human rights will be brought up in any absence, according to the Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism employee at HRW (2011). This is disappointing in itself, even more so when considering the ease with which this can be remedied. In order to uphold the importance that has been placed on human rights in
counter-terrorism, there must be more senior staff to assist the Human Rights Adviser, whether it is by taking over work in New York, or participating in the country visits that the Senior Adviser cannot.

Even though CTED was meant to be a body working closely with states, rather than against them (Restrepo 2011), the CTED employee admitted via email that there are challenges with implementation by states when it comes to human rights in counter-terrorism measures (2011). This may be a sign that the approach needs to change. The UN must consider broader reforms of the counter-terrorism body structures for more effective change to include human rights in counter-terrorism, all of which may be done within the boundaries of what other UN bodies already do. First, rather than a system of voluntary state reporting to CTED, especially given that some states have not reported even once while others have multiple times, according to the CTED employee by email (2011), CTED should consider a review system that looks more like the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the HRC. As the UPR does (OHCHR “Basic Facts” 2008b), all states would be reviewed, which would allow for states that have not yet reported to be reviewed, while keeping up on the situations in states that have. Also, the current system of reporting allows only one side of the story to be known – the side of the states. For this reason, the UN should, first, consider an individual complaints procedure for CTED, similar to what is found in the appeals procedures of the Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctions committees (Krever 2010), possibly confidential like the 1503 procedure of the HRC (UNHRC “Complaint Procedure” 2011). In addition, there must be more civil society engagement due to the greater ability of these organizations to report on violations, as the HRW employee suggested (2011), possibly similar to the ability for NGOs and other stakeholders to provide a report to the HRC on states that are up for review (UNHRC “NGO Participation” 2011). Considering these non-state observations would allow for the bigger picture of human rights in counter-terrorism measures to be evaluated by CTED.

If the UN, especially the Security Council and its counter-terrorism bodies, would like to continue as a “leader in the global fight against terrorism” (Smith 2011) while upholding the idea in resolution 1963 that human rights and counter-terrorism are “complementary and mutually reinforcing” (2010), the organization
should at least continue good practices and reform counter-terrorism efforts within the boundaries of the existing structure. However, as Mike Smith, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of CTED recognized in his decennial article on UN counter-terrorism efforts, measures that do not have human rights in mind “can actually undermine the collective effort” (2011). This is why the UN, Security Council, and its subsidiary counter-terrorism bodies, even though originally meant to be non-confrontational (Restrepo 2011), should consider broader reforms for a stronger structure due to a steady failure to translate efforts to state action. The UN and the counter-terrorism bodies have great potential to give human rights a more substantial position in counter-terrorism, and this potential should be explored, especially with upcoming reports including the global survey on resolution 1624 implementation pointed out by the CTED employee (2011) and the 2012 interim report on CTED proposed in resolution 1963 (UN Security Council 2010).

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Suffering has a prominent place in both *Prometheus Unbound* and “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills.” In each work, however, Shelley depicts both the nature of suffering, and the means by which it is overcome, in strikingly different manners. This paper argues that in *Prometheus Unbound*, suffering has its source and termination in the consciousness of he who suffers, while in “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” external factors, and particularly the places one inhabits, are positioned as its primary cause and end. The mariner, whose suffering and well-being are mediated by his physical location, fails to attain and embody lasting peace in the present moment. Disillusioned by reality, he clings to fantasy, locating paradise in an abstract—and indeed, purely conceptual—bower. Prometheus, on the other hand, transcends suffering through the counter-intuitive turn to cease demonizing, and thereby inadvertently empowering, Jupiter, the so-called “Monarch of Gods and Daemons,” and apparent agent of his pain (1.1). Prometheus’s liberation occurs within the sphere of his own psyche, in the form of his radical shift in consciousness from hatred to pity. This deliberate psychological shift radically disrupts Prometheus’s perception of Jupiter as a dominant tyrant, destabilizing Jupiter’s reign and enabling Prometheus to assert his own autonomy. Unlike the mariner, who futilely seeks refuge in a utopian bower that is entirely divorced from reality, Prometheus embodies ultimate well-being in the present moment by means of his radical shift in consciousness.

Shelley’s depiction of liberation as the product of an internal, psychological shift, particularly amidst an atmosphere of overwhelming physical oppression, is anathema for many. John Ried, for instance, acknowledges that “purification takes place wholly within the horizon of Prometheus’s psychology,” but finds this notion, alone, to be “severely anti-humanist,” as it reifies “a bourgeois individualist concept of freedom” (783; 788). While Rieder rightfully asserts that “sovereignty” can’t possibly be
reduced to “a mere psychological issue,” particularly in relation to real-world instances of oppression, in the world of the text, “thought,” as Asia explains, “is the measure of the universe” (793; II. iv. 73). Rieder’s application of his personal conviction to the text seems to have shaped his claim, which is textually unfounded, that Prometheus’s curse, rather than his later shift in consciousness, is the actual catalyst for his liberation. This paper will assert the primacy of Prometheus’s psychological triumph while also elucidating the fact that liberation is not exclusively confined to the sphere of Prometheus’s individual psyche. Though his attainment of sovereignty is achieved through a distinctly psychological triumph, this internally localized shift in consciousness eventuates tangible and widespread change in the surrounding world.

In “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” the mariner seeks to escape suffering not by enacting a radical shift in consciousness, but rather, by attempting to evade its apparent stimulus through travel. While Prometheus prevails in his pursuit, the world itself, as a direct response, transforms from a place of great pain to an abode of love and beauty, the mariner fails, and the world remains in its original, miserable condition. In both Prometheus Unbound and “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” a secluded place, a cave and a bower respectively, is positioned as the ideal atmosphere in which ultimate well-being is to be experienced and expressed. The mariner’s well-being, which is purely theoretical, depends upon the space, while Prometheus’s peace, which is actual and embodied, precedes it. The mariner, additionally, never physically inhabits his bower, which is, in this sense, merely the imaginary product of escapism and disillusionment. Prometheus’s cave, which he actually inhabits with his consort, Asia, becomes an ideal space for the couple to experience and express ecstatic love. Furthermore, while Prometheus and Asia cleanse the world with love by sending forth art from the space of their cave, in “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” those who seek love must retreat to the mariner’s bower, which is, again, merely an abstract, idealized and inherently imaginary construct, in order to find it. In this sense, while in “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” external circumstances, and particularly the mariner’s location, are identified as both the source of suffering, and the theoretical means to escape it, in Prometheus Unbound, an individual’s conscious response to his surroundings serves as suffering’s
cause and end. While Prometheus, liberated from the internal burdens of hatred and despair, becomes an autonomous agent capable of effectuating meaningful change in the world around him, the mariner, hopelessly tethered to the misery both within and without the confines of his psyche, places his faith in a vague utopia which is inherently elsewhere, and therefore entirely unattainable.

In “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” Shelley meditates on existence through the extended metaphor of a mariner at sea. He employs this particular metaphor, within which life is imagined as “a voyage over a dangerous sea of time-mortality,” elsewhere in his work (Reiman 581). For instance, “Time,” a lyric poem, opens with the proclamation “Unfathomable Sea! Whose waves are years,” thereby enabling Shelley to explore the nature of existence through the prism of the ocean (Reiman 581). In “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” Shelley depicts the ocean more poignantly, by overlaying its surface with the emotional tone of misery. In this sense, Shelley not only utilizes the sea as an object for contemplating time, but directly invests it with a distinctly negative emotion. He identifies misery as the “deep wide sea” in which man, the “worn and wan” mariner, “drift[s] on his weary way” (2-6). Man is, within this scheme, stripped of his autonomy and positioned as particularly passive; he does not steer his ship across the ocean, but merely “drifts” (6). The mariner, entirely at the mercy of his surroundings, is encircled by an atmosphere of suffering, which overwhelms him and his journey; “solid darkness black/ clos[es] round his vessel’s track” (7-8). In mapping misery onto the ocean, which occupies the vast majority of the space in which the mariner travels, Shelley represents suffering as the dominant emotion of human experience. In contrast, Shelley inscribes well-being on the “green isle[s]” which merely punctuate, like stars in a midnight sky, that vast sea of sadness (7).

The mariner perceives his experience of well-being, in this sense, to be entirely contingent upon external circumstances. He believes that he is only capable of experiencing respite by removing himself from the sea and temporarily inhabiting an island in its stead. Thus, within the metaphorical scheme of the poem, the mariner’s environment directly determines his emotions; his happiness depends upon the “flowering islands” which “lie/ in the waters of wide Agony” (66-7). The difficulty with this scheme is
that, again, while the ocean dominates the space, the islands are particularly rare to come by. The mariner, then, is locked into an entirely unbalanced dualistic formula, in which the experience of misery is not only inevitable, but guaranteed to be more common than the experience of well-being. The mariner's experience of well-being does not stem from his response to his external circumstance, but instead depends upon the circumstance itself. In this sense, the mariner does not have the capacity, as Prometheus does, to attain well-being by adjusting his mentality, reclaiming his agency, and reshaping his world. While Prometheus declares himself "king over myself," the mariner remains a passive victim, stripped of the capacity to constructively act, and thus entirely at the mercy of his surroundings, depending on the islands for ephemeral relief (l. 492).

In the third verse paragraph of the poem, first person narration replaces third person narration, and the mariner describes his experience on one such island, which is located "mid the mountains Euganean" (70). Immediately upon landing on this particular island, the mariner beholds the majestic sunrise, which illuminates the entire atmosphere. While "the sunless sky,/ big with clouds," had "[hung] heavily" above the sea, the mariner excitedly greets "the sun's uprise majestical" (73). He no longer laments, as he did while drifting across the sea, the misery of his condition, but rather becomes an attentive and receptive observer of the natural world; he becomes, in Emerson's words, a transparent eyeball, blissfully beholding the beauty of his surroundings. He listens "to the paen/ with which the legioned rooks did hail" the sun, and watches the rooks fly skyward, "till th'eastern heaven/ bursts" with the color of the rising sun (71-2; 75-6). The mariner describes the splendor of the sun's ascent in the language of rich aestheticism, noting the clouds "flecked with fire and azure," and "starred with drops of golden rain," which "gleam above the sunlight woods" (78-82). He traces the sun's progressive ascent through the mist which had previously dominated the scene, "till all is bright, and clear, and still,/ round the solitary hill" (88-9).

The mariner likens the "waveless plain of Lombardy"—on which he stands—to an ocean, comparing its numerous cities to islands (91). Lombardy, within this conceptual scheme, is said to be "spread like a green sea" and "islanded by cities fair" (90-3). The mariner soon devotes his focus to one particular "island"
within this context, the city of Venice, which appears as a “peopled labyrinth of walls” (96). The mariner thus shifts his perspective, and drastically adjusts the scope of his focus to close in on the space and place of Venice. He notes that this city, though surrounded by the ocean, which he had previously viewed as the source of ultimate agony, is not in the slightest bit strained by its presence. Rather, Venice is distinctly vivified by the sea. The city is imagined, in particularly evocative language, as the “ocean’s nursling” (95). In this sense, while the mariner inhabits this terrestrial space, the sea is no longer envisioned as malevolent and destructive, but benevolent; it does not afflict the city, but nourishes her with motherly love.

Venice is saturated with natural majesty; the mariner describes the land in elegant language suffused with aesthetic energy and religious symbolism. The sun is “broad, red, radiant” and “half-reclined/ on the level quivering line/ of the waters crystalline” (101-3). The architecture of the city stands before this brilliant sun, the great “chasm of light” which casts its light across the land (104). The sun’s light permeates the city, causing its walls to glow as though they were standing in “a furnace bright” (104-5). The sun thus streams through the structures of the city, signifying the vivifying relationship between the city and the whole of nature. The “column, tower, dome, and spire” of Venice “shine” in the majestic presence of the sun, like “obelisks of fire” (106-7). Obelisks, which originated in ancient Egypt, are colossal monuments constructed for the function of reverencing for the sun. The “obelisks” of Venice “[point] with inconstant motion” upwards, “to the sapphire-tinted skies,” suggesting, again the harmonious relationship between the city and the rest of nature (107-10). The “obelisks” stand amidst the “altar of the dark ocean,” and, in this sense, connect the sky above and the sea below (107; 109). The architecture, again wrapped in religious imagery, is also likened to “the flames of sacrifice,” which, “from the marble shrines did rise,” and “pierce” Apollo’s “dome of gold” (111-4).

The mariner’s vision of Venice, as a paradise suffused with natural and spiritual beauty, echoes the world of the liberated Prometheus in its apparent grandeur. This initial vision, however, is radically revised when the mariner witnesses the grim impact of humanity upon the land. “Now is come a darker day,” he declares, observing Venice’s “conquest-branded brow” (117-9). He proclaims, lamenting Venice’s defeat by France and Austria, that
the land has “stoop[ed] to the slave of slaves/ from [its] throne, among the waves” (106; 123-4). He foresees the city’s structural collapse, predicting that it will be “among the waves,” its former grandeur consumed by the ocean which once nourished it (124). The sea, he predicts, will consume its “isles depopulate,” excepting the still standing “palace gate[s],” which will, with “green sea-flowers overgrown,” soon appear “like a rock of ocean’s own” (127-131). These last standing vestiges of the city too shall “[ttopple] over the abandoned sea/ as the tides change sullenly” (132-3). He envisions the city as a “murdered…and moldering” body, a “corpse of greatness,” to which “human forms,/ like pollution nourished worms” feebly “cling” (146-9). These descriptions vividly convey both the fleeting nature of Venice’s greatness and the general ephemerality of the green isles in the sea, as they are, in essence, still subjected to the conquest of time.

The mariner, at this point in the text, apprehends the grim status of the city he once viewed—both from his position in the sea and in his immediate impressions of the land—as a veritable refuge from agony. He then extrapolates this localized vision, imagining “a hundred cities” of the sort, all “chained like thee, ingloriously,” plagued by the presence of tyranny and the absence of “Freedom” (150-155). In this sense, the mariner can find refuge neither in the ocean, which is marked by all consuming misery, nor the green isle of Venice, which he finds to be, upon closer inspection, enslaved by the hands of humanity. Nor, in fact, can he find refuge in the hundred more potential cities in the distance, which he imagines to be equally enslaved. While Prometheus perseveres despite the oppressive condition of his surroundings, and ultimately attains a shift in consciousness which affords both inner-liberation and the liberation of the world, the mariner merely collapses into hopelessness under the weight of his despair.

Impelled by his dejection, the mariner is forced to flee, soon seeing the ephemeral potential for Padua to serve as an adequate refuge from both the ocean of misery and the enslavement he has witnessed in Venice. Venice, enveloped in a mist, suddenly shifts out of his view, and Padua arises. “The beams of morn lie dead,” the mariner remarks, “on the towers of Venice now,/ like its glory long ago,” beyond the “skirts of that grey cloud,” though, “many-domed Padua proud/ stands” (210-12; 214-6). This positive vision of Padua continues, with the mariner
describing it as a “peopled solitude,” consisting of a “harvest-shining plain” (216-7). This thin glimpse of rich potential quickly dissolves, however, when he sees that “the peasant” who “heaps his grain,” is depositing it “in the garner of his foe” (218-9). The mariner likens the presence of the oppressor in this land to “a weed whose shade is poison” (226). Furthermore, the mariner posits that Death and Sin have dominion over the land, as “both have ruled from shore to shore” (251). The mariner’s representational merging, here, of tangible tyrants with the archetypical vices of Death and Sin, suggests his recognition of the universal scope of oppression. Human tyrants are positioned, within the scheme, as localized manifestations of abstract, insurmountable forces.

The mariner laments that “in thine halls the lamp of learning,/ Padua, now no more is burning,” as its brilliance has been “trampled out by tyranny” (256-7; 268). He likens the ephemerality of the city’s brilliance to that of a passing meteor, “whose wild way/ is lost over the grave of day” (258-9). In sum, the mariner initially views Padua, like Venice—albeit much more briefly—as a land of potential promise and beauty, a veritable green isle of refuge in a sea of agony. However, he shifts his opinion when the presence of oppression, which suffocates the formerly glorious city, reveals itself. Though the mariner’s objection to the oppressive atmosphere of both Venice and Padua is, of course, only appropriate, it is not the slightest bit constructive or liberatory. He does not, like Prometheus, succeed in initiating positive change in the environment, but succumbs to its apparent inevitability. Moved by this conviction, the mariner retreats, returning again to his futile search for peace through perpetual flight.

The mariner continues to cling to the prospect that “other flowering isles must be/ in the sea of Life and Agony” (335-6). However, this abstract conviction, informed by his experience on a number of seemingly promising islands, leads him to turn from tangible reality altogether in his endless quest for respite. Though he wishes to liberate “other spirits” who “float and flee/ o’er that gulph,” waiting to be transported to “some calm and blooming cove,” he can only imagine such an achievement (337-8). Within his utopian musing, the mariner endows himself with great agency; he pictures himself as a messianic figure, saving other suffering spirits from a world of despair to an Edenic cove in the
distance. In actuality, he has yet to even save himself. This cove on which his well-being, and the well-being of the world at large, depends, is an entirely idealized space, comparable to a heavenly mirage. The mariner dreams of this refuge in a manner that Baker finds both "regressive and narcissistic," as well as entirely "utopian" (153). Furthermore, Baker notes that the mariner's experience of well-being, within this scheme, "cannot emerge from the present but must constitute a decisive break from the present;" it must, in fact, constitute a decisive break from reality itself, as his refuge does not actually exist (153). The mariner conjectures that "we may live so happy there," in that "healing Paradise," and envisions the others, whom he disparagingly refers to as "the polluting multitude," who will be enticed to join him (352-5). This "clime divine and calm" will, in the mariner's mind, foster the liberation of mankind from the burden of their suffering (358). The mariner imagines that ultimate well-being will arise "in that sweet abode," and posits that "the love which heals all strife," will "[circle] like the breath of life" (367-8). He believes that this space will ultimately function to transform humanity: all will "repent" their "envy vain," and, as a result, "the earth" will "grow young again" (372-3). In this sense, the change which the mariner hopes to see both in his own consciousness, and in the world as a whole, depends upon his relocation to a hypothetical bower. His transcendence of suffering and experience of well-being cannot possibly be embodied in the here and now, as his liberation hinges on the discovery of a distant, abstract, and ultimately non-existent, utopia.

In Prometheus Unbound, the eponymous hero attains ultimate well-being by enacting a radical shift in consciousness, renouncing hatred and embittered resistance in favor of pity, compassion and love. The work begins before this shift occurs, with Prometheus addressing Jupiter, the "monarch of Gods and Daemons," who has subjected him to endless torment (I. 1). Prometheus, pinned to a barren rock, declares himself Jupiter's "foe;" he is "eyeless in [his] hate" (I. 9). Prometheus, bound by Jupiter and blinded by hatred, relinquishes both autonomy and intelligence. He is not, at this point in the narrative, a conscious agent, but an "eyeless" enemy, whose identity is subsumed in Jupiter's; his self is constructed in relation to the tyrant's dominance (I. 9). In this context, Prometheus is entirely incapable of constructive thought and action (I. 9). Prometheus laments his condition, which has persisted for "three thousand years," and has
consisted of “sleep-unsheltered hours/ and moments,” each “divided by keen pangs,” so that they “seemed years” (I. 12-4). He surveys the “eagle-baffling mountain” to which he is nailed, finding it entirely deprived of vitality (I. 20). It is “black, wintry, dead, unmeasured” and “without herb/ insect, or beast, or shape or sound of life” (I. 21-2). Prometheus proceeds to scan the planet as a whole, finding it similarly suffused with suffering. The whole of earth, he declares, has been “made multitudinous with [Jupiter’s] slaves” (I. 5). Much like the mariner, adrift in his sea of misery, Prometheus resigns himself to agony. He suffers without a single green island in sight.

Prometheus declares that he will only be heir to “pain, pain ever, forever!” (I. 23). He expects neither “change,” nor “pause,” nor “hope” (I. 24). He describes the intensity of his suffering by suggesting the complicity of both the natural and spiritual worlds. “The crawling glaciers pierce me with the spears/ of their moon-freezing crystals,” he cries, and “the genii of the storm, urging the rage/ of whirlwind…afflict me with keen hail” (I. 31-2; 42-3). Misery thus eclipses Prometheus’s psyche, body and physical surroundings. His liberation, however, does not depend upon a physical shift—as it does for the mariner—but a radical shift in consciousness. According to M.H. Abrams, who reads the text as a dramatic representation of the disintegration and reintegration of self and world, Prometheus has “fallen into disunity and conflict” due to his “moral error” of “having succumbed”—albeit in response to tyranny—to the “divisive passion of hate” (598). Prometheus’s reversion to hatred, in this sense, is destructive rather than constructive and imprisoning rather than liberatory (Abrams 598). Despite his condition, Prometheus soon experiences “a sudden, right-angled break-through,” that closely resembles the satori of Zen Buddhists, which awakens him from hatred to pity, ignorance to wisdom, and fear to love (Abrams 598).

Prometheus berates Jupiter as a “cruel King” who is to be “disdained” as a “prostrate slave” (I. 52). This particular image, of the “prostrate slave,” rather than further stoking his loathing, startles Prometheus into a spontaneous expression of sympathy (I. 52). He recognizes his foe as a slave to ignorance and hatred, and comes to “pity” his oppressor, rather than persisting in resisting him with vitriol and scorn (I. 53). Prometheus realizes, in fact, that he can “hate no more,” and that misery, rather than merely assailing his soul, has “made [him] wise” (I. 57-8).
spontaneously awakens, in this sense, from his “eyeless” hatred to the wisdom of compassion (I. 9). Aware of his transformation, Prometheus declares that “I am changed so that aught evil wish/ is dead within” and explains that he has “no memory.../ of what is hate” (I. 70-2). In response to Prometheus’s shift in consciousness, the Earth itself declares him to be “more than God,” as he is both “wise and kind” (I. 145). Prometheus had bitterly reviled Jupiter, thereby constructing a barrier of hatred that actually functioned as a prison between himself and his oppressor. However, he ultimately overcomes his personal dejection and imprisonment through awakening by collapsing this barrier through the energy of empathy. Prometheus had been bound to himself: his agony, his hatred and his pride. Ultimately, his inner-liberation stems from his embodiment of radical love, expressed through his capacity for experiencing pity even for his own oppressor. This shift in consciousness, which results in Prometheus’s internal liberation, ultimately catalyzes the fall of Jupiter and the resultant liberation of the world.

Unbound from the burden of hatred, Prometheus attempts to recall the curse he had previously hurled at Jupiter. Addressing Jupiter as his “all-prevailing foe,” Prometheus had bluntly stated “I curse thee,” before proceeding to beg that a “sufferer’s curse/clasp” Jupiter, until his “Infinity shall be/ a robe of envenomed agony” (I. 285-9). He had cried out for Jupiter’s “Omnipotence” to become as a “crowd of pain/ to cling like burning gold round [his] dissolving brain,” and called for him to be “damned” in a state of “self-torturing solitude” (I. 290-5). The tenor of this curse not only reveals the strength of the hatred that previously dominated Prometheus’s psyche, but the position of power in which he had envisioned his enemy. Prometheus had referred to Jupiter as his “all-prevailing foe,” thus investing him with the position of dominance in the struggle; additionally, he had referenced Jupiter’s “Omnipotence,” thereby reifying an incredibly unbalanced power relationship, and effectively admitting his own defeat (I. 285; 290).

By retracting the curse, Prometheus succeeds in removing the foundation of vengeful opposition upon which Jupiter’s dominance depended; he effectively erases the reification of power that had propped up Jupiter’s oppressive reign. The centrality of the mind to this text, as the prime mover of the world, can not be stressed enough. Prometheus’s shift in consciousness
has the power to initiate both mental and physical liberation. Recalling his curse, Prometheus states that his “words” were “quick and vain,” and that he was “blind” in his “grief” while expressing such hatred (I. 303-4). Furthermore, he declares “I wish no living thing to suffer pain” (I. 305). When juxtaposing the content of the curse to his revocation, we not only glimpse Prometheus’s shift from hatred to compassion, but his newly embodied autonomy. While Prometheus had previously seen his foe as an omnipotent tyrant, whose power was “all-prevailing,” and therefore unassailable, he now conceives of Jupiter as deserving of his own sympathy (I. 285). Prometheus no longer views himself as the passive victim of Jupiter, nor does he declare himself to be Jupiter’s superior. His identity then, is not constructed in relation to Jupiter’s. Rather, he proclaims, “I am king over myself, and rule/the torturing and conflicting throngs within” (I. 492-3). Prometheus has effectively postured himself in the place of ultimate autonomy. He does not wish to assume Jupiter’s position of world dominion, but recognizes, instead, his inherent agency as the master of his own mind. Unlike the mariner, who futilely flees from agony, and whose well-being depends entirely upon external conditions beyond his own control, Prometheus finds ultimate peace and autonomy in his capacity to control the warring elements of his own psyche. He has transcended the tumult of the human mind, attaining an internal liberation which affords him the experience of ultimate well-being, and effectuates the liberation of his body and the bodies of the world.

Prometheus describes the mind as the source of evil, due to its capacity to pervert the good and the true; “evil minds,” he declares “change good to their own nature” (I. 379-80). As Shelley states in his Defense of Poetry, “all things exist as they are perceived: at least in relation to the percipient” (505). The mind of Prometheus is, in this sense, the central stage on which his battle with tyranny is fought, and Prometheus’s victory consists of a shift in consciousness, from hatred to love. While Twitchell argues a similar case, even declaring Prometheus Unbound to be a “comprehensive metapsychology,” or an attempt, by Shelley, to create a “Gestalt, or a ‘map of consciousness,’ to explain the morphology of the mind,” Rieder—as mentioned in the opening paragraphs—finds such a reading both “too simple” and “too unilateral” (Twitchell 30; Rieder 775). Rieder instead posits, in a manner which is textually unfounded, that the power of Prometheus’s curse precipitates Jupiter’s fall, and that
“Prometheus’s rejection of the curse is actually a repression of it” (782). Though Rieder acknowledges the fact that “purification takes place wholly within the horizon of Prometheus’s psychology,” he finds this reading, alone, to be “severely anti-humanist,” and disagreeably “individualist” (Rieder 783). In this sense, he thus attempts to nuance this interpretation with the notion that Prometheus’s curse is the actual cause of Jupiter’s demise, positing that the power of the curse ultimately culminates in Demogorgon’s “overthrow” of the tyrant (Rieder 791). Again, this interpretation consists of a radical bending of a text. Prometheus’s curse, as exhibited above, does the very opposite, stripping him of his autonomy by reifying Jupiter’s conceptual dominance. It is his shift in consciousness, from hatred to pity, and his retraction of the curse, which effectively erases this reification, and liberates Prometheus, enabling him to declare himself “king over [him]self” (I. 492). This liberation, which takes place in the immediate space of Prometheus’s psyche, has widespread rather than isolated implications, catalyzing the fall of Jupiter and the eventual liberation of the world.

Within the literary universe of Prometheus Unbound, the expression of power is inextricably linked to love; Demogorgon declares that “Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change.../ all things are subject but eternal Love,” and Prometheus posits that “all hope [is] vain but love” (II. iv. 119-20; I. 824). In his Defense of Poetry, Shelley describes love as “the great secret of all morals,” explaining that it entails “a going out of our own nature,” or a radical expansion beyond the rigid boundaries associated with the separative self (487). Furthermore, in his essay “On Love,” composed two months prior to Prometheus Unbound, Shelley “suggests that love is the full expression of sympathy,” which “seeks to awake in all things” a sense of “community” (Isomaki 661). While love yields self-expansion and freedom, evil leads to slavery; “all spirits,” Demororgon explains, “are enslaved who serve things evil” (II. iv. 110). “All love,” Asia offers, “is sweet,/ given or returned,” it is “common as light” and “wearies not ever” (II. v. 39-41). The embodiment of love initiates, within this context, the establishment of everlasting freedom and equality. Love’s function is to collapse barriers between individuals, liberating each from the prison of egotism and “mak[ing] the reptile equal to the God” (II. v. 43). Prometheus’s embracement of love in favor of hatred leads to the collapse of Jupiter’s kingdom, as its very foundation consisted of Prometheus’s own obstinate and
embittered resistance, which, again, has reified Jupiter’s illusory position of power. “The elements,” Jupiter proclaims on falling from his throne, “obey me not...I sink...dizzily down—ever, forever, down” (III. ii. 80-1). Through Prometheus’s all-embracing love, Jupiter, the tyrant God, is made equal to all other beings, and is therefore stripped of his capacity for ultimate control.

After Jupiter’s fall, Hercules releases Prometheus from his chains and proclaims him the “most glorious among Spirits” due to his embodiment of “wisdom, courage and long suffering love” (III. iii. 1-2). On being released, Prometheus declares that he and Asia are to travel to a secluded cave, which closely resembles the phantasmal bower only dreamt of by the mariner in “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills.” The cave will function as a heavenly residence, a site particularly conducive to Prometheus’s continued transmission of love. “There is a Cave,” he declares, “all overgrown with trailing odorous plants,” where “there is heard the ever-moving air/ whispering without from tree to tree,” and “all around are mossy seats/ and the rough walls are clothed with long soft grass” (III. iii. 10-21). In this “simple dwelling,” Prometheus and Asia will “sit and talk of time and change,” entirely “unchanged” by time (III. iii. 24-5). The cosmic couple will here explore the depths of their minds, seeking “for hidden thoughts each lovelier than the last” and translating them into art, including “Painting, Sculpture and rapt Poesy,” along with arts yet “unimagined” (III. iii. 35; 55-6). The two will ultimately become “mediators/ of that best worship, love” and will participate, from the space of their bower, in the process of healing the planet, which has been terrorized and desecrated under Jupiter’s reign (III. iii. 59).

In response to this outpouring of love, most potently expressed through the image of Prometheus kissing the ground, the Earth proclaims that “through my withered, old and icy frame/ the warmth of an immortal youth shoots down” (III. iii. 88-9). A symbiotic relationship between the planet and her inhabitants revives, as the “birds and beasts and fish and human shapes/ which drew disease and pain from my wan bosom,” now “take/ and interchange sweet nutriment” (III. iii. 93-6). Furthermore, all inhabitants of the earth including “snakes and efts” are said to have “put their evil nature off” and the “ill thoughts” that had obscured mankind’s “fair being” are dissolved in love (III. iv. 74-7; 44-5). The forces of tyranny are decentered by the energy of love
which, again, “makes the reptile equal to the God” (II. v. 43). “Thrones” are left “kingless,” and “altars, judgement-seats,” as well as “prisons” are emptied and abandoned (III. i.v. 131; 164). Man becomes “the King/ over himself;” all are “sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed” and “equal, unclassed, tribeless and nationless/ exempt from awe, worship, degree” (III. iv. 194-197).

The “mind/ of humankind” once “dusk and obscene and blind” becomes as “an Ocean/ of clear emotion,/ a Heaven of serene and mighty motion” (IV. 93-98). Shelley himself believed, as this passage suggests, that “all thought is the thought of one mind,” and stated that “the existence of distinct individual minds…is likewise found to be a delusion” (Isomaki 656). Furthermore, he found a distinction between mind and matter to be falsely wrought, as matter is merely another element of the mind (Isomaki 656). He argues that “the difference is merely nominal between those two classes of thought which are vulgarly distinguished by the names of ideas and external objects” (Isomaki 656). In this sense, Prometheus’s embracement of love, along with the transmission of love created by his union with Asia, effectuates the cleansing of the universal mind and, in turn, the world itself. Shelley’s emphasis on the significance of the mind, and his positioning of the manifest world within its circumference, further solidifies the notion that Prometheus’s shift in consciousness, rather than his curse, is the central catalyst for change.

Man, in Prometheus Unbound, is said to be a “many-sided mirror/ which could distort to many a shape of error.” Reality itself, “this true fair world of things,” is, in actuality “a Sea reflecting Love” (IV. 382-4). In this sense, false perception has the capacity to distort the world whereas true perception restores the world to its natural state, which is one suffused with love. Pure love transmutes the pain of the earth, sublimating its “adamantine central gloom” and its “icy frame,” and injecting the land with “life” and “joy” (III. iii. 86-8). “Music,” presumably created by Prometheus and Asia, fills “the sea and air” and the earth is filled with “Love, all Lovel!” (IV 366-9). Love “interpenetrates” the planet’s “granite mass,” moving through “tangled roots and trodden clay…/into the utmost leaves and delicatest flowers” (IV 370-2). The energy of love thus pervades the entirety of the earth, and makes “man” into “one harmonious Soul of many a soul/ whose nature is its own divine control” (IV 400-1). While in “Lines
Written Among the Euganean Hills,” the mariner imagines individuals leaving the contaminated space of the sea and islands to be cleansed in his secluded bower, in *Prometheus Unbound*, Prometheus and Asia cleanse the entire planet by transmitting love *from* the space of their cave. The maintenance of this condition of love depends upon the ability to persist in “forgiv[ing] wrongs darker than Death of Night,” to “defy,” though never with hatred or malice, “Power which seems Omnipotent” and to “love, and bear; to hope, till Hope creates/ from its own wreck the thing it contemplates” (IV. 570-4). In essence, then, the preservation of this paradise depends upon the *consciousness* of its participants.

Overall, while in “Lines Written Among the Euganean Hills,” the mariner’s experience of suffering and well-being is entirely contingent on external conditions, in *Prometheus Unbound*, suffering and well-being are positioned as bi-products of Prometheus’s consciousness. Since the mariner’s peace depends on circumstances beyond his own control, his fulfillment is both ephemeral and insubstantial. Furthermore, the mariner, who initially envisions the green islands which populate the vast sea of misery as conducive to his well-being, soon comes to find that even these apparently promising places are plagued by tyranny and pain. Since he has yet to attain the internal autonomy necessary to bring liberation to self and others, the mariner does not attempt to constructively engage in the world, rather, he seeks to flee it altogether. He desires to depart from both the ocean and the islands that punctuate it, placing his faith in an imaginary bower in the distance. Prometheus, on the other hand, after his shift in consciousness, from hatred to pity and anger to love, embodies ultimate contentment and autonomy, becoming “king over [him]self” regardless of location and circumstance (I. 492). Sovereignty and autonomy, in this sense, have their *source* in the mind of Prometheus; however, liberation is not limited to the sphere of his own psyche. Rather, Prometheus’s shift in consciousness effectuates both the overthrow of Jupiter, and the general dissolution of oppression in the world. Though both the mariner and Prometheus envision an ideal existence in a secluded space, far removed from the vestiges of oppression and pain, the mariner’s bower remains intangible and hypothetical, while Prometheus’s cave is both tangibly real, and blissfully inhabited. Prometheus’s experience of well-being, nonetheless, does not in any way *depend* upon his location, but precedes it altogether. While the mariner locates his well-being not in the immediate
setting of here and now, but in the vague space of elsewhere, and dreams of cleansing the world by bringing others to a utopian bower, Prometheus powerfully and palpably embodies well-being in the present. From the place of their cave, Prometheus and Asia transmit love to the rest of the world, and, in the process, catalyze its return to the paradise it once was.

Works Cited


Mary Shelley was born on the cusp of the nineteenth century, an era destined to boast a wider English readership than ever before. Literacy increased among the mass public in general, yet it was expanded female readership in particular that excited controversial debate. A mass acquisition of literary skills did not necessarily mean inclusion and liberation for women. In fact, as Kate Flint writes in *The Woman Reader*, literature became another means of controlling and protecting the impressionable fairer sex. Conservative men and women eyed serious female authors and readers with a good deal of wariness and aversion. The peculiar struggles that literary women faced can be traced in Shelley’s depiction of the title character of her novel *Frankenstein* (1818), as well as in his feared creature. The creator, who views his work with horror and anxiety, and the creature who seeks identity, individuality, and commonality with more privileged humans, act as affecting representations of the female writer and reader of the nineteenth century.

While critics have commonly interpreted *Frankenstein* as a response to the increasing interest and anxieties swirling around rapid scientific discovery during the nineteenth century, and have addressed the novel’s attention to themes of creation and authorship in relation to gender (Philip Allingham, Victorianweb.org), this paper views the English literacy boom of the nineteenth century as an equally significant influence on Shelley’s writing. Scholars have discussed the authorial fears that Shelley experiences while writing this novel but have not delved into the importance of female literacy as represented by Frankenstein’s monster, who shares many features with the female readers of the nineteenth century. Both nineteenth-century English female readers as well as Frankenstein’s creature face a tricky tension between access and restriction, newfound authority and powerlessness.

Richard Atlick explains in his book *English Common Reader* that “in the nineteenth century the number of English
readers, and therefore the production of the press, multiplied spectacularly” (1). The implications of this phenomenon, however, are not completely quantifiable, and thus the object of much discourse, both during the nineteenth century and after.

Nineteenth-century English society largely did not question the idea that literature had an incredibly powerful influence on people’s thoughts and behavior. Flint notes that literature was widely believed to affect the “individual’s private and moral life [more] than…his or her public concerns….‖ (47). The notion that literature was directly connected to the behavior of its readers, as well as the sense of wonder and trepidation surrounding a rapid expanse of readership, is demonstrated in Matthew Arnold’s “The Study of Poetry,” published in 1888:

We are often told that an era is opening in which we are to see multitudes of a common sort of readers, and masses of a common sort of literature; that such readers do not want and could not relish anything better than such literature, and that to provide it is becoming a vast and profitable industry…. [Good literature] never will lose currency with the world, in spite of monetary appearances; it never will lose supremacy. Currency and supremacy are insured to it, not indeed by the world’s deliberate and conscious choice, but by something far deeper,—by the instinct of self-preservation in humanity. (Norton Anthology 1610-1611)

In this passage, Arnold addresses the concern that many nineteenth-century literary critics harbored regarding mass readership and publication; they worried that standards for literature would decline as it became accessible to a broader spectrum of people. His rhetoric attests to a nineteenth-century belief in the monumental importance and influence of literature, arguing that it is part of humanity’s “instinct of self-preservation” to never wholly displace great literature with cheap, mass-produced texts. Leon Botstein describes in his article “Modernism”, that many nineteenth century intellectuals feared cultural decay in light of mass production: “Doubt was cast on the cultural and aesthetic potential of the present, particularly in the context of rising rates of literacy and the expansion of the audience well beyond the ranks of the 18th-century aristocracy” (1). Flint notes that fiction was not only rising in numbers, but in importance, as it was “specifically accredited with influencing both ideas, and people’s access to knowledge…in a way that had become almost imperceptible” (49).
Thus, debates raged during the nineteenth century regarding how popular novels would influence the increasing number of literate women (Flint 18).

Flint postulates two dominant viewpoints on the subject of women and reading during this era: “Either the woman is improved and educated through access to approved knowledge, which builds on the innately valuable characteristics which she has presumed to retain within her own body; or reading of the forbidden leads to her downfall” (18). Flint’s use of the word “downfall” is particularly appropriate when applied to my image of Frankenstein’s creature as a representation of the female reader. Throughout Frankenstein, Mary Shelley references John Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost; for instance, the novel’s epigraph is a quote from Milton’s Satan. My particular interest in these references rests in the parallels that exist between the creature and Eve, the fallen woman, which connect the monster to a feminine experience of life.

Frankenstein’s creature first sees himself as a reflection in water (Shelley 97). Paradise Lost’s Eve, likewise, is introduced to herself through her own reflection in a stream (Milton 1897). Though they gain physical self-awareness fairly early on in their existence, both characters do not truly know themselves and how they are perceived until they acquire knowledge of the external world and, as a direct result, suffer their downfalls. Eve tastes the forbidden fruit, attains awareness, and falls from grace (Milton 1991); the creature, after learning to read and speak, attempts to not only observe the world, but to become an active participant in his surroundings. He gains an understanding of the world from watching the De Lacey family and reading a few books, most notably Paradise Lost (Shelley 94). He explains that an “increase of knowledge only discovered to me more clearly what a wretched outcast I was. I cherished hope, it is true; but it vanished, when I beheld my person reflected in water, or my shadow in the moon-shine, even as that frail image and that inconstant shade” (97). Reading about Adam and Eve’s companionship creates a yearning in him for a fuller existence than he has hitherto known; one that he can share with other people. But just as Eve is shunted from Eden (Milton 2055), the creature is shunned by the De Lacey’s, who are terrified of him and thus thrust him from their domestic paradise (Shelley 100).
Frankenstein’s creature may be viewed as a representation of the nineteenth-century female reader in view of the tension existing between acquisition of knowledge and lack of power and inclusion. A large portion of English society feared that certain reading material was dangerous for a woman and would result in her downfall, her loss of innocence, and interest in the domestic sphere (Flint 18). The woman reader was not, however, completely shut out from literature and, like Frankenstein’s creature, was often able to obtain reading material from which she was supposed to be protected. Flint writes that there are many accounts from women in the nineteenth century which “indicate how prohibition and censorship in themselves...led to inquisitiveness and transgression” (213). Flint describes many incidents of young girls surreptitiously consuming novels, gliding into their parlors during the night to pilfer books off the shelf like guilty dieters making a midnight run to the cookie jar (210). Yet censorship remained, and women’s relationships to literature were colored by its forbidden nature.

Flint explains that “concern about the effects of novels on women was constantly expressed,” yet, “it is not easy to locate a critical vocabulary for it which does not assume a distanced, patronizing air of disdain for the texts themselves” (Flint 49). In an effort to remain clean of any hint of association, critics often brutally censured this stigmatized art form, a practice exposed by Jane Austen who describes her contemporary novel reviewers as “…abus[ing] such effusions of fancy at their leisure, and over every new novel...talk[ing] in threadbare strains of the trash with which the press now groans” (Northanger Abbey 36). Austen’s use of the word “trash” to describe most reviewers’ opinion of novels reveals the harsh judgment that these texts received despite their popularity.

Elaine Showalter writes in her book A Literature of Their Own, that publishing novels was a daunting task for women during the nineteenth century, not because women could not get published (in fact, there were a great many female authors during this era), but rather because their work was subject to intense scrutiny and often dismissed as unworthy of real admiration; novels were viewed as an inferior art form, meant for less intellectual readers—including women (3). Showalter writes that “Victorian feminine novelists...felt humiliated by the condescension of male critics and spoke intensely of their desire
to avoid special treatment and achieve genuine excellence…” (21). Jane Austen was one woman writer who was unwilling to take the critics’ harsh judgment without defending her place as a mighty pen-wielder.

In *Northanger Abbey* (1817), published just one year before Shelley’s *Frankenstein*, Austen plunges into the debate regarding the value of novels. Pausing from the plot of the book to address her readers in her own voice, Austen urges her fellow novelists to remain united in appreciation of their art form, to respect themselves and thereby demand respect from others, fiercely stating:

I will not adopt that ungenerous and impolitic custom so common with novel-writers, of degrading… the very performances, to the number of which they are themselves adding… scarcely ever permitting them to be read by their own heroine, who, if she accidentally takes up a novel, is sure to turn over its insipid pages with disgust. (36)

According to Austen, novelists themselves were contributing to the prejudice tainting their craft by depicting young ladies who exude shame when caught reading novels in their own works.

Austen’s petition to her fellow novelists to support each other in their work, and her description of literary critics’ treatment of their texts, is echoed in the sentiments of the creature in *Frankenstein*. Victor Frankenstein, a scientific genius, is the main protagonist of the story, capable of bringing to life a form composed of bits of dead body parts. Immediately after the creature comes to life, however, he promptly abandons it, horrified by his own handiwork (Shelley 43). The creature later seeks out Victor and attempts to persuade his maker to view him with feelings other than harsh judgment saying, “You, my creator, abhor me; what hope can I gather from your fellow-creatures, who owe me nothing? They spurn and hate me” (Shelley 74). Victor cannot look upon his creature with anything like fondness, much like Austen’s fellow novelists who condemn their own creations and raise the question, what hope is there for the creations of these writers to receive anything less than censure from critics? Furthermore, the creature pleads with Victor to listen to him, to allow him to tell his story and to establish his own voice, asking that Victor not revile his own creature before he has given him a chance to prove himself: “Listen to my tale: when you have heard
that, abandon or commiserate me, as you shall judge that I deserve. But hear me” (75). Similarly, authors like Austen wished to be read and heard without stereotypes blinding the critics who so coldly and indiscriminately deprecated novels.

Critics often claimed that novels were a “feminine,” and therefore, less intellectual form of literature (Flint 48). Flint quotes nineteenth-century critic Francis Palgrave as saying that many women “go to books for something almost similar to what they find in social conversation. Reading tends to become only another kind of gossip” (48). Flint notes that Palgrave’s remark “links lightweight reading with ‘feminine’ modes of passing the time in trivial, unenduring ways” (48). To combat this harsh judgment, …both sensation and “New Woman” fiction mock within themselves the belief that women read uncritically, unthoughtfully…. They challenge… the assumption that a woman will automatically identify with the central female character in the novel she is reading. They refute the idea that a woman reader is mentally passive and accepting of what she consumes and emphasize her capacity to act as a rational, rather than an emotional, being. (Flint 15)

Through their treatment of female characters and readers in their own fiction, authors began to create a new and substantially more flattering picture of women as writers and readers, as demonstrated in Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s narrative poem “Aurora Leigh” (1865). “Aurora Leigh” boasts as its heroine a spirited, intelligent, and perceptive young woman who reads voraciously and dreams of wearing the laurels of a poet (Barrett Browning 1163). When Aurora Leigh’s cousin Romney scoffs at her book reading and poetry writing, claiming that these intellectual modes only produce a “headache,” she replies, “‘I perceive!– / The headache is too noble for my sex. / You think the heartache would sound decent, / Since that's the woman's special, proper ache, / And altogether tolerable, except / To a woman’” (Barrett Browning 1165). As one might guess, Aurora Leigh’s story does not end in marital felicity.

The heroine resolutely rejects Romney’s proposal of marriage, which she recognizes would mark an end to her endeavors as a writer (Barrett Browning 1166). Romney’s attempt to reign in Aurora Leigh, through his questioning of her intelligence
and abilities is abhorrent to the equality-minded heroine, upon whom he bestows a short tirade about women as authors:

Therefore, this same world / Uncomprehended by you must remain / Uninfluenced by you. Women as you are, / Mere women, personal and passionate, / You give us doating mothers, and chaste wives. / Sublime Madonnas, and enduring saints! / We get no Christ from you, –and verily / We shall not get a poet, in my mind. (1165)

Through Romney’s character, Barrett Browning is able to identify and oppose a widespread negative view of women’s faculties.

Despite Romney’s criticisms, Aurora Leigh struggles between an inclination to love him and be his wife, and her compulsion to build a life around books and words—years later, she wonders if she made the correct choice when rejecting her cousin: “If he had loved, / Ay, loved me, with that retributive face, . . / I might have been a common woman now, / And happier, less known and less left alone; / Perhaps a better woman after all,— / With chubby children hanging on my neck / To keep me low and wise” (Barrett Browning 1166). Frankenstein’s creature likewise begins to suffer emotionally after he has become literate and realizes the extent of his isolation and the condemnation he will receive from those around him (Shelley 97). Similar to the exchanges between Aurora Leigh and Romney, Shelley produces scenes of passionate disagreement between Victor Frankenstein and his creation regarding the creature’s status in society. The creature implores Victor, the embodiment of external, powerful societal force, to recognize his right to equality in humanity; authors like Austen and Barrett Browning used their writing to demand equal participation in the literary world.

The creature approaches Victor gently at first, requesting that he make him a companion to share in the wretchedly isolated life that he has been destined to lead (Shelley 107). He argues that there is no reason for him to be estranged from all pleasure and happiness, kept locked away from the world purely due to his otherness. The creature tells Victor the story of his life in a section of the novel characterized by isolation and yearning similar to that felt in “Aurora Leigh.” After reading *Paradise Lost*, the creature is able to narrate his experience of life with words, to feel and explore all of the pangs of humanity, including the loneliness and
longing he feels when wishing he could join the De Lacey family, yet remains on the outskirts of a full life experience. He desperately wishes for acceptance and for admittance into a society that fears and shuns him based purely on his physical nature (Shelley 97).

The female reader, however, is not the only nineteenth-century figure represented in *Frankenstein*: the female author of the nineteenth century, including Shelley herself, laden with authorial anxieties and self-doubt, is also present in the novel. Victor Frankenstein is unmoved by his creature’s narrative because he is still disgusted by his own creation and, though he begins making a companionate female monster as per the creature’s request, he violently destroys her moments before bringing her to life (Shelley 123). Victor’s tortured relationship to his creature is not unlike Mary Shelley’s relationship to her creation, the text of *Frankenstein*.

In her book *Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters*, Anne Mellor notes that Shelley’s 1831 Introduction to *Frankenstein* is characterized by an apologetic, almost self-deprecating tone, not least of all because Shelley refers to the novel as her “hideous progeny” (Mellor 55). Shelley’s self-deprecating tone was not uncommon among female authors; Showalter explains that many women writers exuded “a persistent self-deprecation of themselves as women, sometimes expressed as humility, sometimes as coy assurance-seeking, and sometimes as the purest self-hatred” (21). Mellor writes that in Shelley’s case, the author thought her novel “all the more horrible for having been produced by so young a girl…. Even fifteen years after the event and when her fame was secure, [she was] strikingly defensive: ‘I am very averse to bringing myself forward in print’” (55). In the same manner that the memory of Victor’s monster plagues him from the moment of its birth, the female novelist’s creation was undoubtedly a cause for concern due to literary critics’ less than warm reception, and the anxiety incited by their criticism.

Mellor views Victor as a representation of Shelley herself as the creator, a woman shaken by intense tremors of authorial anxiety (54). According to Mellor, “for Mary Shelley, the metaphor of book as baby fused a double anxiety, an insecurity about both her authorship and her female identity” (52). Shelley wrote *Frankenstein* when she was only eighteen years old, after having experienced traumatic miscarriages; she was harboring anxieties
about not only mothering a real child, but “giving birth to her ‘self-as-author’” (Mellor 55). Mellor depicts Shelley as identifying heavily with Victor Frankenstein as she herself was a creator and nurturer, terrified of losing or abandoning her child, but also an author frightened of sending her creation into the world (41).

Much of Frankenstein explores the worrying implications of creation, most notably the relationship between creator and created, and the constant anxiety that plagues the maker who fears his or her own work. Victor Frankenstein tells his tale of creation as one fueled at first by ecstatic anticipation of glory and achievement, despite the toiling, seemingly insurmountable difficulty of the task: “Although I possessed the capacity of bestowing animation, yet to prepare a frame for the reception of it, with all its intricacies... still remained a work of inconceivable difficulty and labour” (Shelley 39). As described by Mellor, Shelley viewed her writing with expectant anticipation mixed with intense insecurity: “Mary Shelley grew up expecting that she would write for publication.... She felt a compulsion to write,” (53) yet she allowed her husband, Percy Shelley, to make innumerable corrections to the text, trusting his judgment more than her own (Mellor 57). In the novel, Victor’s feverish excitement gives way to dread as soon as the product is completed: “…now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished, and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart” (Shelley 42). Shelley, similarly, “felt intensely ambivalent” about Frankenstein after its publication, and even apologizes for the “hideous” nature of her creation, an unladylike horror story, in her 1831 Introduction (Mellor 55).

Shelley’s anxieties and difficulties arose from tensions between her authorial compulsions and the atmosphere in which they were to be lived out—an atmosphere described by Showalter as resistant towards female literacy (3). Both Victor and his creature, full of their own compulsions and anxieties, yearn to lead happily balanced lives. Victor longs for achievement, discovery, and glory, yet his life is ultimately consumed by his work. Like Victor, Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh also chooses intellectual work over companionship and thus harbors regrets. In contrast, Victor’s creature wishes for the kind of domestic felicity that Victor takes for granted, yet finds that he will never be able to attain it. Despite their seemingly opposite grievances, these characters share a similar predicament. They must either devote themselves to a life of domesticity and companionship, or choose a life of
knowledgeable solitude. Both choices deny the human of a fundamental need whether it be self-fulfillment or companionship. Similarly, women readers and writers of the nineteenth century attempted to reconcile the individuality that they gained from reading and writing texts, with the expectations that society held for them to lead lives of familiar domesticity (Flint 209).

*Frankenstein* demonstrates a strong link between the nineteenth century female author and reader based upon the similar anxieties and obstacles that they faced. Mary Shelley, no stranger to authorial anxiety, was able to infuse into Victor Frankenstein the inherent fears that accompanied creation. Her status as a woman, meanwhile, colored the character of Victor’s isolated creature whose fearful society shuns him. The creature’s literacy creates in him an ardent desire to find full acceptance in society and to be welcomed into conversations and interactions. He may therefore be seen as an amalgamation of the female author’s creation and the female reader, restricted and stifled despite their substantial increase in production and consumption. Full access to the literary world remained, in many ways, locked away from women. Yet, Victor’s isolated creation outlives his maker at the end of the novel (Shelley 164). However distressed and isolated Shelley’s *Frankenstein* made her feel, it continues to live on long after her lifetime, standing as a testament to her abilities. The nineteenth-century female author and reader are linked not only by their struggles, but by their strength: Shelley’s achievement was great, and so too was the will of the woman reader.

**Works Cited**


DANTE’S PERFECT HIERARCHY: EXILE IN THE AFTERLIFE AND IN FLORENCE

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The afterlife illustrated by Dante Alighieri in his *Divine Comedy* is a hierarchy comprised of three independently hierarchical structures; each human soul, upon death, is placed on a given tier of this hierarchy as fulfills the will of God. A range from the highest Heaven to the deepest circle of Hell is representative of relative distance from God, from perfection, from the ultimate Good (Lansing 155). Liberty to move freely in the afterlife is contingent on one’s proximity to that Good. Souls that are closer to God, and therefore higher in the hierarchy, have a greater ability to move about, not only within their designated circles, terraces, and spheres, but also between the structures of the afterlife. The ability to pass between Paradise, Purgatory and Hell is the ability to pass between the city structures that exist in the afterlife, to pass through gates freely, and to not experience exile. Through his illustration of freedom of motion based on proximity to the Good, Dante asserts that one’s freedom to enter into a given city or society should be contingent upon one’s goodness. In the afterlife, that contingency is fact; in Florence, Dante’s earthly realm, admittance is not contingent upon one’s goodness. According to Dante, God’s hierarchy, the hierarchy of Goodness, should rule in Florence, but does not. Likewise, exile should be based on sinfulness and refusal to repent, and freedom based on goodness. Dante illustrates this prescription for Florence through his Divine hierarchy.

The hierarchy of Goodness was not invented by Dante, but Dante fleshed it out thoroughly and specifically within a Christian context in his poetic journey through the afterlife. Dante and other thinkers during the High Middle Ages inherited the idea of an innate hierarchy of being from Plato and Aristotle, who had established that “all things in the universe could be classified according to the degree of their innate perfection” (Lansing 155). From Dante’s Christian perspective, this relative innate perfection and proximity to the Good is proximity to God Himself. Dante’s illustration of the hierarchy of Goodness as a hierarchy of
proximity to God reconciles the classical teachings inherited by Dante and Christianity. Such a perspective “aligns all forms of existence within a hierarchical order according to each being’s capacity for reflecting the highest level of existence, the Divinity,” with respect to which every being has “some degree of imperfection” (Lansing 155). Beatrice explains to Dante in the *Paradiso* that placement in the hierarchy of the afterlife is based on Goodness, that “all things, among themselves, possess an order; and this order is the form that makes the universe like God” (1.103-105). The order is Goodness, within which “higher beings see the imprint of the Eternal worth” (Dante, *Paradiso* 1.106-107).

Dante divides this innate hierarchy, “most commonly known as the *scala naturae* (‘ladder of being’),” into six levels, “the first two of which are angelic and human” (Lansing 155). Although all humans exist on the same “rung” of this “ladder of being,” the fact that they share a rung does not imply that all humans are in equal proximity to the Good. Within that rung on the ladder exists another hierarchy: the entire afterlife as illustrated by Dante in the *Comedy*. “The concept of hierarchy at the heart of the chain of being... is the fundamental paradigm that underlies Dante’s placement of individuals in one of the three realms of the otherworld.” Humanity has a hierarchy all of its own based on each individual’s spiritual proximity to God (Lansing 155). As Beatrice explains to Dante in *Paradiso*, upon death each human is placed in a circle, terrace, or sphere “nearer or less near to its origin,” which is God or Goodness, based on God’s will (Dante, *Paradiso* 1.111). Similarly, angels comprise a separate hierarchy within which groups of angels with more Goodness are placed closer to God. Because the circle of the Seraphim is the circle of angels that “loves most and know most” (Dante, *Paradiso* 28.72), it is the circle that is understood to be “closest unto God” (Dante, *Paradiso* 4.28). Likewise, the more *caritas*, or charitable love, that a human exercises, the more a human reflects the Goodness that is God, the nearer to God that human’s place on the hierarchy will be.

A critical consequence of Goodness and subsequent placement within the hierarchy of Dante’s afterlife is a proportional freedom of motion. Those placed in the *Inferno* are eternally trapped in their torments based upon another hierarchy that is specific to the worst sin for which they have not repented. Within the hierarchy of Dante’s *Inferno*, the punishment for those in the
The deepest circle of Hell is to be frozen, and completely immersed in ice (34.11-12). The frozen state of these souls represents their lack of ability to move towards God, which is rooted in their lack of desire to do so – desire that, in *Purgatorio* and *Paradiso*, perpetuates motion. Lack of desire leaves souls frozen in their own sin. Satan is likewise trapped in ice, flapping his wings in vain, never to escape the frozen pit (Dante, *Inferno* 34.28-50). Those in Purgatory, who are spurred by a desire to be purged, and to be near God, can move, and do move up the mountain of Purgatory. While they are retained and purged through acts appropriate to each one’s sin, they willingly accept appropriate punishment out of an “[anxiousness] to advance,” out of a “longing to see [God],” and out of a desire for the Good that will place them in Paradise (Dante, *Purgatorio* 18.115, 5.57). Those who desire the Good are free to move towards God.

Paradise is full of motion on a variety of levels. The spheres of Paradise themselves move more quickly the closer they are to God, out of a desire for God. The motion of the sphere nearest to God, “so swift because of burning love that urges it,” spurs the motion of the universe towards God, which “must match the motion of the circle that loves most and knows the most” (Dante, *Paradiso* 28.44-45, 28.71-72). Within these spheres, souls whose desire for God reflects the rapid motion of the spheres are free to move, and free to dance, with desire for God (Dante, *Paradiso* 13.28). This movement is metaphorical and occurs for Dante’s sake, that he might understand through his human senses that desire for God creates motion around Him. Within Dante’s vision of the Empyrean, “the saints become one huge flower, the celestial rose, and the angels are a multitude of bees, dipping in and out of it as they move incessantly between God and the happy human souls” (Cornish 43) (Dante, *Paradiso* 30.94, 31.7). Not only are these souls in the highest Heaven free to move; they move rapidly and continuously, and always around God, reflecting their proximity to the Good through a show of their desire for that Good.

Freedom of motion of those who more completely reflect the Good than others, though it increases within each tier of the hierarchy as Dante climbs through the afterlife, is not exclusive to one’s own circle, terrace, or sphere. The higher a soul is placed on this hierarchy, the more freedom that soul has to roam between structures, between Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise.
Those in Hell, even those not trapped in ice, are consigned to their individual circles, and under the threat of the demons’ punishment (which many of these souls endure regardless of their behavior), cannot move or act beyond the tier to which they are relegated (Dante, *Inferno* 22.92-93). It is within Hell that Dante first encounters a being moving and acting beyond the tier to which it has been assigned. An angelic messenger, sent to open the gates of Dis for Dante and Virgil, meets “no resistance” in doing so (Dante, *Inferno* 9.90). This angel is free to travel between structures of the afterlife because of his eternal proximity to the Good in Paradise, a proximity that comes with the ability to penetrate the walls of a variety of structures.

The clearest example of the Good allowing a soul to penetrate the gates of a structure of the afterlife to which it does not belong is Christ’s Harrowing of Hell. “Jesus triumphally descended into Hell… after the crucifixion and remained there until the resurrection, during which time he brought salvation to those just souls who had awaited his coming,” proving that Goodness grants access through all gates (Iannucci 470). Christ’s Harrowing, his entrance into Hell and his removal of its inhabitants, represents “a total victory over the powers of… death and Satan,” and demonstrates the ability of the Good to exercise grace that redistributes and reshapes the hierarchy of the afterlife where Christ, the human manifestation of the Good, sees fit (Iannucci 470). The “descent of Beatrice into Limbo” is “delicately modeled on the harrowing of hell” and serves as another example of the ability of those in close proximity to God to move and act between structures in the afterlife (Iannucci 470). As a Christ figure, and as the central sacramental image in the life of Dante, Beatrice has the ability to pass through any gate in the afterlife due to her proximity to the Good. The Goodness of God is all that is necessary in order to pass through any gate below one’s assigned tier.

Angels serve as further examples of beings able to pass between structures in the afterlife based on their proximity to God. The helmsman who brings souls to Purgatory is an angel whose eternal tier on the hierarchy is in Paradise, and whose proximity to God would not consign him to Purgatory, but allows him to remain in Purgatory in order to fulfill his duty (Dante, *Purgatorio* 2:27-29). The angels who descend into the Valley of the Princes to protect the souls of that tier from the serpent, also find their eternal place
in Paradise. They also would not be consigned to any terrace of Purgatory, but are sent to utilize their Goodness to protect the souls being purged (Dante, *Purgatorio* 8.25-33, 106). It is an angel who etches the seven “P”s representing the seven sins being purged onto Dante’s forehead, and there is another angel who removes each one (Dante, *Purgatorio* 4.112-14, 7.133-35). Yet another angel guards the gates to Purgatory proper (Dante, *Purgatorio* 9.104). Such functions are necessary in the afterlife and are carried out by angels as fulfills the will of God. Angels, based on their placement within the hierarchy of the Good, are not consigned to Purgatory in order to be purged as are the human souls who enter there, but have the ability to enter based on their proximity to the Good. They are able to guard and pass through gates other than their own due to their freedom to move and act, freedom again derived from their eternal proximity to the Good.

That one must pass through gates and walls in order to enter the structures of the afterlife signifies that these structures represent cities like those on earth, and the ability to move between structures in the afterlife is like the ability to move between separate earthly structures and societies. That the ability to enter into any structure of the afterlife is based purely on proximity to the Good helps Dante to illustrate the afterlife as his ideal city. Florence is widely accepted to serve as the model for the “afterlife city of Dis,” and the hierarchy of the entire structure of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise serves as Dante’s ideal society; the city of Paradise being the “city of eternal light” (Debs 17, 18). The illustration of the afterlife as three separate city structures is made clear by the presence of “the gates that grant entrance, and the walls themselves,” that “to enter the city, one [has] to pass through the main gate” (Debs 17). Not just anyone can gain entrance to any given city, including any of the cities in the afterlife. In Florence, as well as in the afterlife, “not only did [gates] keep unwanted parties outside the city, but they also kept everything pertinent to the city itself inside” (Debs 18). And just like any earthly city, the “essence” of the cities of the afterlife is “its citizens that [inhabit] it” (Debs 19). It is the city’s inhabitants that make Hell a place of torment, that make Purgatory a place of beauty and hope, and that make Paradise a place of eternal happiness, and it is therefore pertinent that entrance into these cities be monitored.

In the afterlife, entrance into each hierarchical structure is monitored based on one’s proximity to the Good, and equating
these structures to cities allows Dante to assert that entrance into earthly cities should be based on the same criterion.

The use of cities to illustrate the afterlife is based on Dante’s subscription to the teaching of Aristotle: that social organization is an ideal and necessary part of a fulfilling human existence (Mandelbaum, *Paradiso* 337). By applying this understanding to a Christian afterlife, Dante once again reconciles his classical intellectual understanding and his Christian faith. When asked by Charles Martel whether it would “be worse for man on earth if he were not a citizen,” Dante’s immediate response is affirmative; Paradise is the ideal social organization, which Florence attempts, and in Dante’s lifetime has failed, to imitate (Dante, *Paradiso* 8.115-116). As on earth, exile, or removal from a social organization, is possible from all cities of the afterlife. Within the walls of Inferno are evil and sin; it is a Hell to be living in Dante’s Florence, but to be exiled even from that city itself is not necessarily for the better. Likewise, souls from Limbo are exiled from the city of Dis and denied a societal existence, and although Hell is a place of horror, its inhabitants, including Satan, have the benefit of existing within a city structure. As Dante enters Hell, his adversaries “[slam] shut the gates against [Virgil], who, left outside... [mutters]: ‘Who dares deny me access to the realm of pain?’” (Dante, *Inferno* 8.115-120). Virgil’s question serves as a bitter reflection of Dante’s view of Florence as a realm of pain and darkness and a bitter reflection on the pain of any exile, even exile from such a city. Dante equates Virgil’s exile from Hell to his own exile from Florence, both incredibly painful experiences, the most important difference being that Virgil’s exile from Hell occurs within God’s hierarchy, which is just and based on proximity to the Good. Dante’s exile stems from a corrupt and unjust Florence, whose hierarchy is equally unjust.

Exile, even exile from a city of darkness, reaps pain. How much more painful, then, it must be to experience exile from a place of beauty, as are those souls in the *Inferno* who will never see Purgatory or Paradise, since Hell will never again be harrowed. Dante, himself “a political exile, a man without a state,” expresses his sympathy for those in Limbo, those without a proper home, through Virgil’s story (Kleinhenz 339). Once exiled, Dante spent his life “moving from city to city, from court to court,” having no home but at least having the ability to travel; those in Limbo are not able to travel at all (Kleinhenz 339-40). Virgil is the only
exception to the rule that those remaining in and consigned to Limbo after the harrowing of Hell will never see Purgatory. But even Virgil’s time spent as the exception to that rule is experienced with a tragic sense of bitterness. Virgil wishes for Statius in Purgatorio that “the true court soon give [Statius] peace in the blessed, though it binds [Virgil] in eternal exile” (Dante 21.16-18). Although Virgil experiences eternal exile from Paradise, his poetry has saved others from experiencing the same eternal exile. “Through [Virgil], [Statius] was a poet and, through [Virgil], a Christian” (Dante, Purgatorio 22.73-74). Some commentators respond to Virgil’s supersession of the apparent hierarchy by making Virgil and his poetry represent “Reason” (Hollander 863). “Reason,” then, allows Virgil, Dante, and Statius, to pass through the gates of Purgatory, but Reason alone cannot allow them to reach Paradise. Perhaps that Virgil could lead Statius to Christianity through poetry justifies Virgil’s ability to temporarily experience Purgatory; perhaps unintentionally pointing others towards the Good that is God was the act that would allow Virgil to move beyond his assigned tier of the hierarchy. Because Virgil himself never had faith in God, however, he is eternally consigned to Limbo, eternally to be exiled from Paradise. No matter the city from which one is exiled, on earth or in the afterlife, exile is a painful experience. However, in the afterlife, unlike in Florence, exile, even if its circumstances and nuances are not readily understood, is always just.

Dante himself serves as an example of an exception to the hierarchy of the afterlife. Although this exception is the direct result of the will of God, it is not necessarily readily understood by those of human nature, even by Dante the character, but especially by the reader of the Comedy. As a human still alive in his body, Dante is perhaps the most intriguing case of a soul able to penetrate the gates of cities and societies in the afterlife. Whether or not Dante still possesses his human body when he enters into Paradise is never fully resolved by the text, but it is still “central to the narrative of the Commedia… that the pilgrim goes to the otherworld in the body and experiences it through his senses” (Durling 116). Even the souls in Hell, who fail to recognize the Goodness and justice of God as it informs their placement in the Inferno, recognize the significance of Dante’s entry into their city with a human body prior to his earthly death. These notable exceptions to the understood hierarchy emphasize the nature of Dante’s journey as sanctioned by God. Dante the character does
not need to understand the entire hierarchy for the truth to remain that it is constructed solely based on proximity to the Good and reflects directly the will of God, as the hierarchy in Florence fails to do.

A question then arises regarding the applicability of this hierarchy in Florence if those of human nature are not readily able to understand it. Dante’s passage through the afterlife is in itself a stinging message to Florence, that although he cannot enter his native city on earth, God has allowed him to pass through the gates of much more important cities, whether they be desolate, hopeful, or Divine. But how is Florence to redeem itself if it cannot understand the hierarchy that it is supposed to put into practice?

Although the structure outlined by Dante, with its notable exceptions, is not necessarily practical for use in earthly society, the ideal structure is of the highest importance to Dante. That the hierarchy is based on the proximity of a person to the Good is the ultimate understanding that Florence should observe and attempt to enact within its own walls. Although proximity to the Good is not fully understood by human nature, all of humanity has a basic understanding of the Good. The loyalty of Florence should lie in this basic understanding of the Good rather than in corrupt politics and skewed social and political values. Political leadership in Florence may not be able to fully understand the Good, but it can look towards the Good and allow the Good to inform the hierarchy of the city.

Florence, which serves as the “model for the corrupt society displayed in the Inferno,” is a corrupt city, and any corrupt city can only be corrupted by its inhabitants who fail to see society and hierarchy the way they ought (Najemy 82). The citizens of Hell, who hate God and fail to recognize God’s infallibility, are a “parody of the Florentine popolo” (Najemy 92). People of Florence, according to Dante, largely believed in the infallibility of themselves, their heredity, and “family prestige,” rejecting the Goodness of God (Najemy 80). The purpose of the hierarchy of Dante’s afterlife is to point to what should be, but is not the hierarchy of entry into Florence, a hierarchy based on holiness rather than family connection or heredity. Charles Martel, whose soul is in paradise, but whose family will rule unjustly after his death, makes clear to Dante the very real possibility that “from a gentle seed, harsh fruit derives” (Dante, Paradiso 8.93). The ruling classes of Dante’s earthly society perpetuate a system in which
certain houses rule society for indefinite amounts of time, ignoring the possibility that a just ruler may not produce just rulers in his family line – that good may not beget good in the earthly realm. This hierarchy of elite families is not conducive to the hierarchy of Good illustrated by Dante.

According to Dante, such extreme family loyalty leads to corruption and injustice, as illustrated by usurers being weighed down by their respective family emblems in the seventh circle of Hell (Dante, *Inferno* 17.1-78). While souls in Hell are largely unhappy with their placement, souls in Paradise, no matter their placement, desire only their own tier. “Should [they] desire a higher sphere than [their own], then [their] desires would be discordant with the will of Him who has assigned [them there], but you’ll see no such discord in these spheres;” those souls accept their placement willingly (Dante, *Paradiso* 3.73-76). The just soul knows its place based on God’s judgment of the soul’s proximity to the Good, and understands that citizens are “diverse, with diverse duties,” diverse places in society, as discussed by Charles Martel, that are based on the Will of God, not family or hereditary connections (Dante, *Paradiso* 8.120). The souls who are dangerously loyal to family and heredity have created a hierarchy in Florence that opposes God’s justice, and they thereby place themselves in eternal torment. Souls in Hell and in Florence rely on their own personal conceptions of what has hierarchical value, on wealth, on family loyalty, and on material gain, failing to understand a hierarchy based on the Good.

In 1302, Dante was sentenced to “future exclusion from politics, payment of a fine, and exile for two years” for “barratry, extortion, and resistance to the pope,” and because of resistance to that sentence, was “condemned and... permanently banned from entering Florence under penalty of death” (Trone 362). Dante’s exile was not based on his Goodness or lack thereof, but on resistance to the Pope, whose seat is criticized extensively in the *Comedy*, particularly in the *Inferno*. The *Comedy* emphasizes that adherence to earthly law is not necessarily conducive to Goodness and therefore should not be the determining factor in one’s ability to enter into a city, to enter through the gates of a society. Upon reaching the second terrace of Purgatory, Dante states that he “[fears] much more the punishment below; [his] soul is anxious, in suspense; already [he feels] the heavy weights of the first terrace,” at once humbly admitting that pride is his worst
sin, and subtly alluding that he will indeed return to Purgatory, and through that journey, become an eternal citizen of Paradise (Dante, *Purgatorio* 13.136-38). Upon his death, Dante will indeed become more fully a citizen of the afterlife, first of Purgatory, then of Paradise, proof that Florence was wrong to exile Dante, and that his exile was based in injustice.

God’s hierarchy, based on Goodness, divine justice, and proximity to God Himself, defeats the corrupt hierarchy that makes its home in both Hell and Florence. Although Dante was exiled from Florence, his exile was grounded in unjust principles and carried out by a corrupt society, a society without consideration for the ultimate Good on which God’s hierarchy is based, and upon which Dante bases his illustration of the afterlife. In Dante’s afterlife, proximity to the Good is the faculty which grants freedom of motion, freedom of entrance through gates, into cities, into society, and into the perfect society that is Paradise. God’s hierarchy is not entirely readily understood, and through it, impossible feats can be performed, such as Virgil’s temporary exodus from Limbo and Dante’s journey through the entire afterlife with his human body. While humankind cannot readily comprehend God’s entire hierarchy in all its complexity, Florence fails to base its hierarchy of freedom of motion and entrance through gates on the basic sense of the Good accessible to the whole of humanity. Dante, through the *Comedy*, prescribes a hierarchy through which Florence might attain the greatness it once had, to rid itself of corruption, greed, and injustice. Although Dante never did return to Florence (Trone 362), he does eventually receive justice, divine justice, and citizenship in Paradise, which entrance into Florence could never have granted him.

**Works Cited**


American culture continues to blur the distinction between war and entertainment, as evidenced by the prevalence of war movies, war coverage in news media, and other visual representations of armed conflict, such as music videos (see Appendix B), that present war imagery as somewhat appealing. These blurred categories are also apparent in the popularity of first-person shooter military video games set in contemporary settings, for example, Battlefield 3 and the latest Call of Duty games. The first three games of Activision’s Call of Duty franchise were set in World War Two settings; in 2007, Activision released Call of Duty: Modern Warfare. The game broke sales records in its first twenty four hours of availability, sales records that each successive Call of Duty game set in modern times—Modern Warfare 2 (2009), Black Ops (2010), and Modern Warfare 3 (2011)—surpassed. Modern Warfare 2 grossed a total of $310 million in the USA and the UK within its first twenty four hours on the market (Szalai), and Activision estimates that, as of August 2011, Modern Warfare 2 (MW2) has sold 22 million copies worldwide (Matos). It took MW2 from its release date in November 2009 until January 2010 to gross $1 billion (Alexander). However, it took MW3 only sixteen days to gross the same amount, one day less than it took the film Avatar to do the same (Rubin). In terms of profit alone, not to mention ads featuring famous celebrities and athletes (see Appendix B) participating in armed combat, Call of Duty’s cultural influence is not to be understated.

In this paper, I will discuss Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 as an important work of contemporary culture, focusing on a specific narrative in the game that details a Russian military invasion of Washington, D.C. Following in the cultural materialist tradition pioneered by Raymond Williams, I am interested in the relationship between MW2, the United States as it sees itself politically, and the late modern global political-economic configuration that political and cultural theorists call neoliberalism.
In order to explore the relationship between art and ideology, David Harvey’s and Wendy Brown’s theories and information regarding neoliberalism prove extremely illuminating. They show, in the words of Louis Althusser, how current economics constitutes subjects of ideology, and how neoliberalism presently affects global politics. The subject is also defined through his or her engagement and consumption of various forms of cultural production, although, granted, ideas are not the only influence on a subject. In this particular historical moment, the neoimperialist and capitalist agendas of America or any other existing imperialist country cannot flourish without persuading the population that the occupied and exploited countries pose a real danger to national security. *MW2* exemplifies these American anxieties concerning perceived threats to our “freedom” and “way of life” in the form of foreign “terrorists” (the current Other) and our seemingly political willingness to protect our freedom by any means necessary. At the same time, *MW2* is not simply a mirror for material conditions, but a relatively autonomous aspect of the superstructure that transforms and shapes social formation.

As theorists Wendy Brown and David Harvey elucidate, the concrete application of neoliberalism’s theories has greatly affected American and global politics in the late modern period. Neoliberalism favors government deregulation of the market so that, in effect, the private sector can organize the market in a way that is, at least regarding theoretical intentionality, beneficial to everyone. As an example, Harvey uses America’s goals in occupying Iraq to define the neoliberal state as one that facilitates “conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital,” which, in turn, gives the market a freedom necessary for multinational corporations, “private property owners,” and other businesses to flourish (7).

Wendy Brown theorizes that the implications of a neoliberal market have a much further reach beyond the market itself in that the market ideology defines the subject. Brown argues that the “neo” in neoliberalism differentiates neoliberalism from Adam Smith’s liberalism in that our current economic system “[extends] and [disseminates] market values to all institutions and social action,” which gives the contemporary ideological subject “neoliberal rationality” (7). That is to say, a human living in a capitalist society will have thoughts and make decisions that are governed by an economic “cost-benefit” rationality, which are then
perceived to be the only way—the natural way—of viewing the world. Neoliberalism in particular is unique because the market is, in effect, organizing the state, as the State's ultimate goal is making sure there is a free private sector (11). However, the division between the public and private sector becomes indistinct. The State is judged by its ability to foster the free market through its immigration policies, treatment of criminals, structure of public education, and fiscal policy, which has the effect of making the State another market actor (12-13). The neoliberal market also affects the way humans view the Norm for morality. As Brown points out, mistakes made by public figures and politicians are labeled as “bad decisions,” as if they were poor investment choices - simply isolated, irrational mistakes (15). To Brown, the market’s goal is to create “prudent subjects” who see no norm other than rational action, and who feed the capitalist reproduction of low costs and high production (16).

Harvey shares similar sentiments towards the modern market and its ideological consequences. Harvey highlights the fact that we now have an assumption that freedom, one of the core principles of American ideology, is dependent upon the free market—without the free market, we are somehow less American (7). As Harvey writes, in 1973, after OPEC raised oil prices, the United States was planning an invasion to restore financial power over the oil market (27). He also states that the CIA engineered a coup in Iran in 1953 so that we could place a leader in power and reward oil contracts for American corporations (28). The belief that America can actively reorganize the global political sphere to better suit its own capitalist interests is still prevalent in our actions and beliefs towards other countries. Harvey then asks the question of how this market shift and eventual redistribution of wealth came to be. Simply, the neoliberal shift was done mostly through ideological state apparatuses like universities, and state apparatuses like political parties, but mostly through culture, as in the media, corporations, and “conversion of many intellectuals” (40). Like any powerful political movement, neoliberalism also had to appeal to past traditions and values, claiming that this shift was necessary for personal freedom, when, in fact, it was mainly for redistribution of capital and creating consent for these international endeavors (40). If Marx is right in assuming that capital “penetrates and transforms every aspect of life,” consent toward foreign conflicts and a “free” individual subject only makes
sense in comparison to the free market formation that is reliant on international occupation (Brown 19).

In 2009, America still had troops in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of the “War on Terror.” The operations are called, respectively, “Operation Enduring Freedom” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Language is, of course, important in unifying people, which, by its very nature, is promoting an agenda. Since 9/11, terms like “war,” “terror,” “freedom” and their ideological synonyms have become symbolic of American foreign policy. The paradoxical term “imposing freedom” is also accepted in popular ideology as something that naturally requires violent force. In a material sense, it is easy to see the Western fear of Others and Terror in airports or on trains where patrons are politely asked to report any suspicious person/activity/behavior, which implicitly means some racialized action or person.

One of the reasons platitudes like the “War on Terror,” metaphorically standing in for the less appealing concept of imperialist domination, prevail is because people buy into the terrorist versus freedom narrative as a means of self-definition, specifically, placing oneself as either for or against the ruling ideology. Naturally, George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s words surrounding our global role make special note of foreign threats to our “freedom” or our “way of life.” As Harvey notes, a US National Defense Strategy document writes “‘Freedom is the Almighty’s gift to every man and every woman in this world... as the greatest power on earth we have an obligation to help the spread of freedom’” (qtd. in Harvey 6). In Obama’s inaugural address, he states that:

The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart –not out of charity, but because it is theSurest route to our common good... for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. (NYT)

The freedom narrative presented to the citizens, thus inherently dialectically reconstructing, is what forms the subject. The key concept here is the language, never to be underestimated, that concretizes “freedom” as an essential quality that we can, in fact already do, have. It is so great, indeed, that we need to spread
this God-given freedom to other parts of the world who have yet to experience America’s freedom, meaning, a capitalist market. It is also so awesome a gift that we must protect it at any cost. Problems arise when those in power do not realize they confuse democracy and late capitalism, which are not mutually dependable.

*Call of Duty*, specifically the franchise’s installment *Modern Warfare 2*, occupies an interesting space in regards to the ideological narrative of security and freedom, as well as material events. For reference, a brief synopsis of the gameplay’s most interesting narrative (*see Appendix A*): After performing well in combat, a soldier, Joseph Allen, is recruited by the CIA to become part of their espionage section and infiltrates an ultranationalist Russian terrorist group lead by Makarov, a ruthless militarist. As part of the group, Allen, in one of *MW2*’s most famous scenes, opens fire on citizens in a Russian airport. Makarov knows Allen’s true identity, however, and kills him after the massacre, leaving his body in the airport. Russia assumes that this was an American attack and turns on the United States for its perceived terrorist activity. The gameplay then shifts to America, where the Russian military has deceived the United States’ radar defenses and is invading a wealthy Virginia suburb, complete with a Burger Town and shopping area, forcing the US to defend the suburb. The player experiences the combat through Private James Ramirez as the company goes to D.C. to combat the Russian invasion. In a parallel story, a rogue American general deploys a Russian nuclear weapon over D.C., allowing the Rangers to take back the White House just in time to stop the Air Force from carpet bombing the city. The closing image of “Whiskey Hotel” is a sea of green flares atop buildings in D.C., signifying that the United States controls the city again. The Washington monument, the only illuminated aspect of the image, stretches out towards an opening in the sky.

*MW2* is unique to our socio-political context in that it is a filtered representation of the political conditions and propaganda that surround our armed conflicts abroad and our national politics. *MW2* is not reflecting the reality of a Russian attack on America’s capital. In fact, this is most likely less a possibility in the year 2016 projected in the game than in our current post-Cold War relations. However, it can be seen symbolically as perpetuating ideology. It may be realistic, *but it is not reality*. 

[Page: 77]
In *MW2*, the next Great War has come onto American soil by means of a foreign terrorist organization. This attack consciously embodies the fears held by the American populous following 9/11. The surprise invasion of the US, as opposed to us invading them, represents the cultural anxieties American ideology breeds about outsiders and threats. The Russian invasion ravages the bourgeoisie’s status symbols: their houses, lawns, and cars. The Russians surreally destroy America’s symbolic historical context by making the Department of Commerce building, the Washington Monument, the World War II memorial, and the White House sites of armed conflict (*see Appendix A*). The anxiety of losing capital accumulation is a fear indicative of post-Depression/WWII America because, as Brown writes, ideological subjects to and of the market will define their quality of life in relation to finances. Like Harvey’s conception of the neoliberal state, the system that works best is the one that fosters capital accumulation. The player, presumably, has a stake even in the virtual capital.

Also important is the fact that the writers and visual designers of the game are just as much ideological subjects as the consumers who play it. Scott Wilson writes that texts are located in a specific historical context, which “are bound up with a repressive, dominant ideology, yet also provide scope for dissidence” (35). All works of culture in the superstructure *by their nature* are either responding to or opposing dominant ideology. Viewing cultural works in Raymond Williams and Wilson’s perspective examines how aspects of the superstructure are embodied and “put to use in ‘social process’” (Wilson 35). The process in this case is subject formation in relation to the terrorist narrative. *MW2*’s visual images and plot exemplify Harvey’s and Brown’s theoretical frameworks: our neoliberal attitudes toward the illusion of individual autonomy and the perpetuation of the free market by global military domination.

The process the game participates in is creating a subject who actually believes that the actions visualized in the game are “real” in some sense; in order for the game to sell and be effective, indeed it must present a reality derivation. For example, although most likely intended as a joke, the Burger Town franchise that appears in the Northern Virginia suburb in the chapter “Wolverines!” is replicated in the Russian airport where “No Russian” takes place. Our globalizing ideology is evident even as
humor to an observant user of the game. In fact, in “Wolverines!” there is a scene where the American soldiers are fighting on the roof of the Burger Town to secure the area for backup. It is partially ironic, mainly matter-of-fact, that the soldiers are surrounded by Burger Town flags rather than American (Appendix A). The placement of typical military symbols—guns, camouflage, and corpses—next to a parodied corporate logo is metaphorically representing foreign policy. The symbolic defense of Burger Town relates to the fact that, as Harvey elucidates, in order for multinationals to succeed, they need a new labor market and new customers. One of capitalism’s core values, the expanding market, is created through geographical domination ideologically disguised as humanitarian assistance.

In our neoimperialist moment, corporations and other businesses, the controllers and self-regulators of the “free” Market, have, in Althusser’s words, repressive state apparatuses like the military at their disposal for political and ideological power. Scenes of the game that show America, as opposed to Baghdad or Vietnam, burning or as a war zone bring up an interesting point about the way in which this specific work of culture is transmitted. The form of Call of Duty as a videogame allows for a specific experience that other forms of culture—visual art, music, movies, written literature, etc.—do not allow for; Call of Duty and other story-themed videogames contain elements of other forms of culture, like those named above (especially film), but are unique in a few senses.

Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield theorize in Political Shakespeare that there are two meanings cultural materialists imply when using the world “culture”: (1) “analytic” — our whole systems of significations of how a society defines its relationship to the world and (2) “evaluative” — “superior” values that one might come to possess through access to it (vii). By making the distinction between the two uses, Dollimore and Sinfield show that superstructure embeds art in such a way that it serves a range of functions to the consumer. In the analytical sense, MW2 reflects how Americans define themselves in relation to the world: as the superpower whose goal is to militaristically spread freedom. In the evaluative sense, to the consumer who plays this game, he or she is constantly exposed and literally forced to interact with these military-themed images that represent dominant ideology. While playing the game and physically interacting with the images on the
screen, the player is participating in creating and reinforcing the ideology the game transmits, which the player may or may not adopt after putting down the controller. He or she, however, is still exposed to the game’s revision of accepted ideology.

Because of the nature of plot-driven video games such as Call of Duty, the user is unable to stray at all from the main story and must continue doing the actions—killing soldiers, razing the suburbs—that the game requires if he or she is to continue the experience. The user, while constrained to the narrative, is still in control of the difficulty of the game, as well as the limited decisions he or she makes, for instance, using a flashbang at a certain moment or shooting an RPG instead of an assault rifle. Regardless if the user is morally opposed or not to shooting unarmed civilians in airports, the game requires the user to have a certain physical response to the images presented on the screen if he or she wants to consume MW2’s art. While any cultural work’s perceived worth is reliant upon individual perception, video games also require the user to be somewhat skilled, or able to adapt, to the game’s physical motor requirements. Video games thus allow for an interactivity with the medium—the user as active rather than passive consumer—that standard literature and film do not. Despite its status as a game, which may detract from its incorporation into conventional forms of cultural studies, MW2’s nature as a game clearly differentiates it from other cultural experiences. Plus, MW2’s mass appeal and cultural acceptance is clearly demonstrated by its sales figures and cultural permeability.

So, then, why do games like those in the Call of Duty franchise exist? From a pessimistic perspective, its purpose is to recruit young people into joining the military (or at least accepting the ideology). From a more complex perspective, however, it exists as an embodiment of dominant ideologies that are not necessarily designed as such during a social process that our culture is continually engaged in transforming. While ideology has “relative autonomy” from material conditions, it still is informed and constructed by the Iraq War or a desire to accumulate natural resources. That is to say that the material conditions, the actions and law enforcement of the State in recent years, do not simply create the superstructure, or works of culture, but participate in a more sophisticated dialectical interaction. As ideology transforms and shifts, so too does the subject. Cultural artifacts that are military-centered like Call of Duty, The Hurt Locker, Generation
Kill, etc., are dialectically revising ideology just as much as the individual who is subjected to ideology. MW2 is specifically located in our political context of moral panic about perceived threats to “freedom.” By “freedom,” as Harvey and Brown point out, politicians and the media mean a threat to our “free” market. Of course, the people on whom this threat is projected exist outside of our borders. MW2 also exemplifies the connection of the superstructural realm’s militaristic and neoliberal symbols and ideas to the base’s interpretation of them simply by its popularity and cultural significance. However appealing this idea is to conservative thinkers, consumers who play the games in the Call of Duty franchise do not automatically want to join the military and start shooting people just because they engaged in virtual violence for a few hours. Yet, an individual is, through the means of purchasing and playing MW2, as Althusser says, interpellated into ideology and, as a result, uses the game to form a model of the world where he or she can place himself or herself. Thus, MW2 is located in a specific socio-political context while at the same time responsible for altering that context.

Works Cited


Appendix A: Images from Modern Warfare 2

The Department of Commerce building under attack.

The infamous “No Russian” scene.
Above and Right: The suburban shopping center theater.

Left: Northern Virginia as a site of conflict (“Wolverines!”).
War hits home in Washington D.C.

America’s defeat of the Russians in D.C.
The Burger Town defense.

The damaged Washington Monument.
Appendix B: Cultural Images and *Call of Duty* Advertisements

*Rihanna in her music video for “Hard.”*

*Beyoncé performing “If I Were a Boy” at the Grammys.*
Above: Dwight Howard in the Modern Warfare 3 ad “The Vet and the n00b.”

Below: Jonah Hill and Sam Worthington in the same advertisement.
Kobe Bryant in the Black Ops ad “There’s A Soldier in All of Us.”
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